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INTRODUCTION 
Dating back to President Roosevelt’s infamous 1937 proposal,1 
the term “court-packing” has been considered synonymous with 
“power-grabbing,” the general assumption being that supreme court 
expansion attempts are fueled by partisan motivations.2 Yet, while the 
stigma associated with President Roosevelt’s plan initially seemed to 
foreclose the widespread use of court-packing, the past decade has 
seen an atypical resurgence in attempts to expand the number of state 
supreme court seats.3  
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in particular, has been 
the focus of court-packing rumors on several occasions.4 In February 
2013, an amendment to a state senate bill, Senate Bill 10, reportedly 
would have added two more justices to the supreme court to be 
appointed by Republican Governor Pat McCrory.5 The amendment 
 
 1. See infra Section I.A. 
 2. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. Throughout this Comment, I use the 
term “court-packing” generally, referring to any effort targeted at increasing the number 
of justices on any non-appealable court for potentially (not conclusively or exclusively) 
political motivations. 
 3. See infra Section I.B. 
 4. Although this Comment specifically focuses on the state’s highest court, the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals has also been subject to court-packing-related controversies in 
recent years. In 2000, the number of court of appeals judges was increased from twelve to 
fifteen by a Democrat-controlled legislature, the three vacancies being filled by then-
Governor Jim Hunt the day before he left office. See DAVID M. BRITT & ROBERT M. 
HUNTER, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA 8 (2016), 
http://celebrate.nccourts.org/sites/default/files/HISTORY_OF_COA_3_Mar_2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6FN3-MLSP]. Despite the court’s steadily increasing workload prior to 
2000, id., Republican opponents deemed it “an attempt by Democrats to have more 
Democratic judges appointed to the court before Hunt left office,” noting that the court’s 
then chief judge “said he didn’t want the extra judges.” Colin Campbell, Lawmakers to 
Return to Raleigh with Open-Ended Agenda, NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 10, 2016, 10:18 
AM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article120130838.html 
[https://perma.cc/NU6W-D3CE]. 
 5. See Laura Leslie, Senate GOP Seeks to Sweep Oversight Boards, WRAL (Feb. 5, 
2013), http://www.wral.com/senate-gop-seeks-to-sweep-oversight-boards-/12066869/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ACJ-BGUE] (“Another provision [of Senate Bill 10] would have added 
two justices to the North Carolina Supreme Court, appointed by [Governor] McCrory, 
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was ultimately dropped from the bill in committee, but not without an 
accompanying promise from the chairman of the Senate Rules 
Committee that “the concept would be revisited later.”6 
More recently, in the wake of the impending transition of 
gubernatorial and judicial power from one party to another, many 
observers wondered whether North Carolina’s Republican lawmakers 
would use the December 2016 special session to pass court-packing 
legislation before the Republican Governor was ousted.7 Although 
the stated purpose of the session was to “address [the] important 
needs” of communities impacted by Hurricane Matthew,8 several 
sources—including a former justice of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina—claimed that North Carolina legislators had plans to use 
the Hurricane Matthew special session to add two more justices to the 
state’s highest court.9 Some even noted that this was “not a new 
 
which would essentially allow the Governor to stack the court without an election.”); Bill 
Raftery, Surprise Effort by NC Senate GOP to Expand Supreme Court Loses After House 
Balks, Likely to Return, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 5, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/2013/02
/05/surprise-effort-by-nc-senate-gop-to-expand-supreme-court-loses-after-house-balks-
likely-to-return/ [https://perma.cc/5M94-GFF8] (“This morning’s meeting of the North 
Carolina Senate Rules committee to consider SB 10	.	.	.	turned to a different direction 
when Republicans put forth an effort to expand the state’s Supreme Court by 2 seats and 
let the newly elected Republican governor fill the new vacancies.”). 
 6. Leslie, supra note 5. 
 7. See Billy Corriher, North Carolina’s Legislature Has a Devious Plan to Overturn 
the Will of the Voters, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 15, 2016, 1:48 PM), https://thinkprogress.org
/north-carolina-supreme-court-33e0873acb30#.9f0l9yt5k [http://perma.cc/LVR7-U9GD]; 
Nathan Luzum, N.C. Republicans May Propose Court-Packing Bill to Keep Control of 
State Supreme Court, CHRON. (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2016
/11/n-c-republicans-may-propose-court-packing-bill-to-keep-control-of-n-c-supreme-court 
[http://perma.cc/X3MC-DT3V]; Mark Joseph Stern, NC Gov. Calls Special Legislative 
Session, Setting Up Possibility of Court-Packing Power Grab, SLATE (Dec. 2, 2016, 5:28 
PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2016/12/02/mccrory_calls_for_special_legislative
_session_is_a_court_packing_bill_coming.html [https://perma.cc/L8X3-Q2VE]. 
 8. Governor Calls Matthew Special Session, N.C. NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 2, 2016, 
1:27 PM), http://www.ncnn.com/edit-news/9944-governor-calls-matthew-special-session 
[https://perma.cc/32NU-RXPK]. 
 9. See Melissa Boughton, GOP Legislative Leaders Could Make Rare Court-Packing 
Move to Keep Partisan Control of State Supreme Court, NC POL’Y WATCH (Nov. 11, 
2016), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2016/11/11/gop-legislative-leaders-make-rare-court-
packing-move-keep-partisan-control-state-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/KR4R-X3FS] 
(“Former Justice Bob Orr and Common Cause North Carolina Executive Director Bob 
Phillips both said Thursday that they’ve heard rumors about plans to expand the court.”); 
Richard Craver & Bertrand Gutierrez, State GOP Leaders Could Neutralize Democrats’ 
Supreme Court Majority by Adding Justices, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Nov. 11, 2016), 
http://www.journalnow.com/news/elections/state/state-gop-leaders-could-neutralize-democrats-
supreme-court-majority-by/article_510c2c00-f7ea-5c8d-9251-26a784d6cb9c.html [https://perma.cc
/TVF3-2TU3] (referencing a state legislator and lawyer as their confidential sources for 
North Carolina court-packing rumors). 
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idea.”10 And given the North Carolina General Assembly’s prior 
track record of using special sessions to pass controversial 
legislation,11 these concerns were not without merit. 
Aside from the predictably negative reactions from North 
Carolina Democrats, the 2016 court-packing rumors were also met 
with hostility from several non-partisan organizations. Days after the 
2016 election, the Public Trust and Confidence Committee 
(“PTCC”), a subset of the North Carolina Commission on the 
Administration of Law & Justice (“NCCALJ”) established by 
Supreme Court of North Carolina Chief Justice Mark Martin,12 met to 
discuss “the need to put the focus back on judicial independence.”13 
At this meeting, the PTCC passed a motion requesting that the full 
commission issue a statement “opposing the expansion of our 
Supreme Court unless the [North Carolina Administrative Office of 
the Courts] requests additional justices to meet workload demands.”14 
Another motion urged “the General Assembly to tie the number of 
judges and justices on a given court to the workload of the relevant 
court” because “any other consideration for numbers of judges and 
justices threatens public trust and confidence.”15 Similarly, another 
non-partisan organization, the North Carolina Advocates for Justice 
(“NCAJ”),16 issued a statement opposing the expansion of the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina in December 2016.17 Analogous to 
the PTCC’s sentiments, the NCAJ focused on the lack of any 
 
 10. Boughton, supra note 9. 
 11. In another 2016 special session, for instance, North Carolina legislators passed a 
controversial transgender bathroom bill, commonly referred to as H.B. 2, “before most 
voters even knew what was happening.” Stern, supra note 7.  
 12. N.C. COMM’N ON THE ADMIN. OF LAW & JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM OF NORTH 
CAROLINA vii (2017), http://wwwcache.wral.com/asset/news/state/nccapitol/2017/03/15
/16586686/uid14896180933836/nccalj_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QHE-ND3H]. 
The NCCALJ is a “sixty-five member, multidisciplinary commission” convened by Justice 
Martin in order to “undertake a comprehensive and independent review of North 
Carolina’s court system and make recommendations for improving the administration of 
justice in North Carolina.” Id. 
 13. PUB. TR. & CONFIDENCE COMM., N.C. COMM’N ON THE ADMIN. OF LAW & 
JUSTICE, MEETING MINUTES 1, Nov. 15, 2016, http://nccalj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016
/11/20161115-PTCC-Meeting-Minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/T83H-N77F]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. NCAJ is a self-described “nonpartisan association of legal professionals dedicated 
to protecting people’s rights.” N.C. ADVOCS. FOR JUST., https://www.ncaj.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/S45U-243W]. 
 17. See Letter from N.C. Advocates for Justice to the N.C. Senators 1 (Dec. 9, 2016) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
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workload-based justification for enlargement of the supreme court.18 
In a letter addressed to North Carolina senators, the NCAJ noted, 
[N]o General Assembly, under either party, has expanded the 
Supreme Court in the last five decades despite having the 
constitutional authority to do so—because it was not justified. 
To do so now in a special session dedicated to disaster relief 
would be a mistake. Such a significant change deserves the 
regular process of open deliberation in regular legislative 
session.19 
Of course, none of these court-packing predictions ever 
materialized, and the number of Supreme Court of North Carolina 
justices has remained unchanged for several decades.20 However, 
given the enduring rumors of North Carolina court-packing, the 
North Carolina General Assembly’s recent modifications to the state 
judicial election processes,21 the unexpected results of North 
Carolina’s 2016 gubernatorial and judicial elections,22 and the 
successful passage of court-packing legislation in Georgia and 
Arizona in 2016,23 North Carolina’s court-packing debate is far from 
resolved. 
This Comment therefore undertakes an analysis of the modern 
court-packing debate, specifically focusing on the prospect of a North 
Carolina court-packing plan. Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I 
provides a general history of court-packing legislation in the United 
States, starting with President Roosevelt’s 1937 plan. It then briefly 
overviews the state-level court packing plans that have been proposed 
over the past decade, with an emphasis on the 2016 laws passed by 
Arizona and Georgia. Part II discusses the relevant constitutional 
bases for the North Carolina judiciary, as well as its current 
landscape. Specifically, this Part examines the current workload of the 
state supreme court, the General Assembly’s recent modifications to 
the state’s judicial election processes, and the divergent results of 
North Carolina’s 2016 judicial elections.  
Finally, Part III proposes three prerequisite factors that should 
be considered before expanding state supreme courts: (1) the 
practical necessity of additional justices, determined by looking at the 
state’s population as well as the court’s efficiency and workload; (2) 
 
 18. Id. at 2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra Section II.C. 
 22. See infra Section II.D. 
 23. See infra Section I.B.2. 
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the cost of expanding the court; and (3) the effect of court-packing on 
the integrity and independence of the judicial branch. When applying 
these factors to the prospect of a North Carolina court-packing plan, 
this Comment asserts that it is clear that any benefit from a court-
packing plan is outweighed by the resulting financial detriment, 
further-diminished caseload, destruction of public confidence in the 
courts, and erosion of judicial power 
I. COURT-PACKING LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. President Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-Packing Plan 
Even though Article III of the United States Constitution is 
silent on the question of how many justices should serve on the 
United States Supreme Court, the Court’s nine-person composition 
has not changed since the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1869.24 In 
1937, however, President Franklin Roosevelt boldly challenged this 
now-entrenched standard with the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill—
better known as his “court-packing plan.”25 
The origins of President Roosevelt’s plan date back to before he 
took office, when the Democratic leader privately and publicly 
expressed concerns over the Republican-controlled Supreme Court.26 
The controversy between the thirty-second President and the Court, 
however, did not come to a head until several years after he was 
elected.27 The President’s “New Deal” legislation was the center of 
this dispute; with many Americans still feeling the effects of the Great 
 
 24. See JOHN V. ORTH, HOW MANY JUDGES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE A SUPREME 
COURT? 2 (2006). 
 25. The term “court-packing” was created based on the perception that President 
Roosevelt was attempting to “pack” the conservative court with liberal justices in order to 
keep his New Deal legislation intact. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. The 
definition of court-packing, however, is hardly uniform. Some scholars have adopted a 
much broader definition, finding that court-packing occurs “every time a President 
nominates a person to the Bench and the nomination is confirmed by the Senate.” J.R. 
Saylor, “Court Packing” Prior to FDR, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 147, 147 (1968). Others, in 
contrast, have limited the term’s scope to refer to a change in the size of a court that leads 
to the appointment of additional justices. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 46 (1980). 
 26. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 83 (1995) (“Even before 
Roosevelt took office, he had aroused speculation over whether his presidency would 
result in a confrontation with the Court.”). 
 27. In his first two years in office, the President “eyed the Court warily” and “put off 
tests of the constitutionality of the legislation of the First Hundred Days as long as 
possible.” Id. at 84. As a result, he was able to momentarily “dispel the conviction that a 
collision between [himself] and the judiciary was inevitable and that steps must be taken to 
revamp the Supreme Court, ideas that emerged remarkably early.” Id. 
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Depression, President Roosevelt, alongside a Democratic-controlled 
Congress, almost immediately began introducing legislation designed 
to hasten “Relief, Recovery, and Reform.”28 But it was not until 
January 1935 that the Court first reviewed and, in an 8-1 decision, 
ultimately struck down one piece of Roosevelt’s New Deal 
legislation.29 
From there, Roosevelt’s contentious relationship with the 
Supreme Court only further deteriorated. In May 1935, the Court 
issued three unanimous opinions striking down another two pieces of 
New Deal legislation30 and also limited the President’s removal 
powers over members of independent regulatory agencies.31 Again, 
the Court echoed the same concerns about Congress delegating to the 
President “unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks 
may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of 
trade or industry.”32 In June 1936, in what appeared to be “the last 
straw” for New Deal proponents,33 the Court in Morehead v. New 
York ex rel. Tipaldo34 struck down New York’s minimum-wage law 
 
 28. Mary Kate Blaine, The New Deal: Legislation & Policies, GILDER LEHRMAN 
INST. AM. HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/content/new-deal-legislation-policies 
[https://perma.cc/RBF9-WABD]. 
 29. See Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). The Court reasoned that 
portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”) unconstitutionally delegated 
legislative power to the President and expressly noted, “The point is not one of motives, 
but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is not a substitute.” Id. at 420. 
 30. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935) (finding 
the Frazier-Lemke Act void on the ground that it violated the takings clause of the Fifth 
Amendment); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) 
(striking down the remainder of the NIRA as “an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power”). 
 31. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628–29 (1935). 
 32. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537–38; see also Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 
629–30 (“The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments 
of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of 
either of the others has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question.	.	.	.	The 
power of removal here claimed for the President falls within this principle, since its 
coercive influence threatens the independence of a commission.”). 
 33. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 26, at 105. The five-member majority’s stubborn 
approach resulted in “national outcry against the Court,” id., and has since been deemed 
“[p]erhaps the most unpopular decision of the 1935–1936 Supreme Court term,” John W. 
Johnson, Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 234, 234 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 
2d ed. 2009). 
 34. 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
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for women as an improper use of state power,35 despite its recent 
indication that the fixing of wages and hours was a state matter.36 
Throughout this period, Roosevelt generally minimized his 
public condemnations of the Court. In private, however, he was 
meeting with a group of lawyers and advisors to craft a solution to his 
stalled agenda.37 Several alternatives to increasing the size of the 
Court were discussed but ultimately rejected in favor of the Judicial 
Procedures Reform Bill.38 Under the bill, when an existing federal 
judge––including Supreme Court justices––with at least ten years of 
service remained on the bench for more than six months after 
reaching the age of seventy, the President would be allowed to 
appoint an additional judge to that court.39 And, because the Supreme 
Court was, at the time, the most elderly court to date, this proposal 
would have allowed Roosevelt to “appoint six new Justices to the 
Supreme Court (and 44 judges to lower federal courts) thus instantly 
tipping the political balance on the Court dramatically in his favor.”40 
But despite his true anti-obstructionist motivations, the President 
framed the bill as a way to remedy the “lowered mental or physical 
vigor” of aging federal judges.41 President Roosevelt claimed that life 
tenure of judges was “not intended to create a static judiciary” and 
that “[a] constant and systematic addition of younger blood [would] 
vitalize the courts and better equip them to recognize and apply the 
essential concepts of justice in light of the needs and the facts of an 
ever-changing world.”42 The President and his advisors hoped that 
“[b]y emphasizing the need for greater efficiency	.	.	. the plan would 
be accepted as a project for judicial reform rather than being viewed 
simply as a stratagem to pack the Court.”43 
 
 35. Id. at 618.  
 36. Compare Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 550 (“[T]he attempt	.	.	.	to fix the hours 
and wages of employees of defendants in their intrastate business was not a valid exercise 
of federal power.”), with Morehead, 298 U.S. at 611 (“[T]he State is without power by any 
form of legislation to prohibit, change, or nullify contracts between employers and adult 
women workers as to the amount of wages to be paid.”). 
 37. See William E. Leuchtenburg, When Franklin Roosevelt Clashed with the Supreme 
Court—and Lost, SMITHSONIAN (May 2005), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history
/when-franklin-roosevelt-clashed-with-the-supreme-court-and-lost-78497994/ [https://perma.cc
/4LBS-E2LH]. 
 38. See Barry Cushman, Court-Packing and Compromise, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 2–
4 (2013) (detailing the President’s consideration and rejection of alternative solutions). 
 39. See S. 1392, 75th Cong. §	1(a)–(b) (1937); H.R. 4417, 75th Cong. §	1(a)–(b) (1937). 
 40. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 37. 
 41. President Presents a Plan for Reorganization of the Judicial Branch of the 
Government, 1937 PUB. PAPERS 51, 55 (Feb. 5, 1937). 
 42. Id. 
 43. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 26, at 125. 
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Roosevelt’s attempt at hiding his true motivation, however, was 
unsuccessful. The plan, introduced to Congress in February 1937, was 
immediately criticized as a partisan attempt to prevent the Court 
from stonewalling his New Deal legislation by appointing more liberal 
justices.44 Throughout the entire country, the bill “generated an 
intensity of response unmatched by any legislative controversy of this 
century.”45 Unsurprisingly, public opinion on the court-packing plan 
was strongly divided based on party affiliation. According to a March 
1937 Gallup Poll, seventy percent of Democrats favored Roosevelt’s 
proposal, compared to a mere eight percent of Republicans.46 Media 
coverage was largely influential, as “discussions of the plan from 
every conceivable angle” dominated newspaper headlines across the 
country.47 
Ultimately, Roosevelt’s court-packing plan failed to pass.48 Yet, 
despite the President’s underlying partisan objectives, this failure is 
almost entirely attributed to external factors rather than his subjective 
motivations. Less than two months after the bill was introduced, 
historically anti-New Deal Justice Owen Roberts voted to uphold a 
Washington minimum wage law49—an ideological shift known as “the 
switch in time that saved nine.”50 Shortly after, in May 1937, 
 
 44. See id. at 138; FDR’s “Court-Packing” Plan, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/fdrs-court-packing-plan [https://perma.cc/JAF2-YS8P] 
(“Roosevelt’s motive was clear—to shape the ideological balance of the Court so that it 
would cease striking down his New Deal legislation. As a result, the plan was widely and 
vehemently criticized.”). 
 45. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 26, at 134. 
 46. Lydia Saad, Gallup Vault: A Supreme Court Power Play, GALLUP (Feb. 26, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/vault/189617/supreme-court-power-play.aspx [https://perma.cc/V2VM
-VEMW]. This partisan divide continued “for the next several months until the plan 
became moot.” Id. 
 47. Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s Court-
Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1141 (1987). 
 48. How FDR Lost His Brief War on the Supreme Court, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Feb. 5, 
2013), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/how-fdr-lost-his-brief-war-on-the-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/LW9W-6XG6] (“FDR’s war on the court was short-lived, and it was 
defeated by a craft chief justice and Roosevelt’s own party members.”).  
 49. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
 50. Just nine months prior, Justice Roberts had joined the Morehead majority in 
striking down the New York minimum wage law. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. 
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936). “The reversal was blunt and unembarrassed—and a 
shock.” BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT 
AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY 158 (2009). But the motivations behind Justice 
Roberts’ change-of-heart remain the subject of debate. See Brian T. Goldman, The Switch 
in Time That Saved Nine: A Study of Justice Owen Roberts’s Vote in West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, C. UNDERGRADUATE RES. ELECTRONIC J. 110–13 (2012), 
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1181&context=curej [https://perma.cc
/CK3K-NVK4] (concluding that “Justice Roberts’s votes in Morehead and Parrish derived 
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conservative Justice Willis Van Devanter announced his impending 
retirement, which, combined with several close 5-4 decisions, 
“decreased support for Roosevelt’s proposal by nearly” ten percent.51 
The following month, the Senate Judiciary Committee released a 
scathing report denouncing the bill as a “needless, futile and utterly 
dangerous abandonment of constitutional principle” that violated 
“every sacred tradition of American democracy.”52 Eventually, in July 
1937, the President was forced to accept defeat, as the Senate 
returned his court-packing bill to committee, where it would remain 
indefinitely.53 
In light of the “vigorous opposition” to President Roosevelt’s 
1937 court-packing plan,54 it is unsurprising that there have been no 
attempts to pick up where President Roosevelt left off.55 As explained 
by one scholar, “the possibility of change in the frequency of 
appointments has become inextricably associated with partisan 
threats to the independence of the Court” due to Roosevelt’s (and 
others’) politically motivated court-packing attempts.56 Accordingly, 
 
from a desire to run for president in 1936”); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a 
Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 102–03 (2010) (providing 
quantitative evidence “rebutting naive accounts that Roberts’s vote in Parrish was a direct 
result of the court-packing plan”). 
 51. Caldeira, supra note 47, at 1148–49. 
 52. MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT 
CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 485 (2002). 
 53. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 26, at 153. 
 54. Id. at 137. 
 55. In 2013, some conservatives characterized President Barack Obama’s attempts to 
fill existing federal court vacancies as “court-packing.” See Barnini Chakraborty, 
Conservatives Accuse Obama of Packing Key Court to ‘Rubber Stamp’ Agenda, FOX NEWS 
(Aug. 24, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/08/24/republicans-accuse-obama-
court-packing.html [https://perma.cc/3KXB-NE6K]; Alfred S. Regnery, Obama’s Court 
Packing Plan, BREITBART (June 12, 2013), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2013
/06/12/obamas-court-packing-plan/ [https://perma.cc/2APG-8WTT]; Ammon Simon, 
Republican AGs vs. Obama’s Court-Packing Plan, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/362398/republican-ags-vs-obamas-court-packing-
plan-ammon-simon [https://perma.cc/X8WC-QG6J]. However, filling existing federal 
court vacancies does not comport with this Comment’s definition of “court-packing.” See 
supra note 2. 
 56. John M. Lawlor, Court Packing Revisited: A Proposal for Rationalizing the Timing 
of Appointments to the Supreme Court, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 969 (1986); see also Laura 
A. Cisneros, Transformative Properties of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan and the Significance 
of Symbol, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61, 79 (2012) (“[T]he ‘Court-Packing Plan’ phrase tends 
to be used to identify unauthorized or unwanted attacks on the judiciary.”); Michael 
O’Donnell, A Wedge Against Tyranny: Franklin Roosevelt v. the Supreme Court, NATION 
(July 28, 2010), https://www.thenation.com/article/wedge-against-tyranny/ 
[https://perma.cc/75RX-E2P2] (“[Court-packing plans] dangerously concentrate power in 
one branch and undermine the authority of the Supreme Court, leaving it weak at those 
moments when we sorely need it.”). 
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the legacy of the 1937 plan appears to have “reinforced a natural 
tendency to avoid changes in the Court’s traditional size and system 
of appointments.”57 Although the logic of the current nine-member 
Supreme Court structure has not gone completely unquestioned,58 it 
remains unlikely that this number will be modified anytime soon, 
given the longevity of this now-entrenched structure. 
B. The Recent Resurgence of State Court-Packing  
Proposals to enlarge the number of state supreme court seats, in 
contrast, have been a far more common occurrence in recent years. 
According to William Raftery, a National Center for State Courts 
analyst who has kept record of recent efforts to modify the number of 
state supreme court justices, there has been a “dramatic uptick” in 
states attempting to pass, and, in two recent instances, successfully 
enacting, “overtly political” court-packing legislation over the past 
decade.59 
1.  Unsuccessful Attempts 
As documented by Raftery, the vast majority of state court-
packing attempts over the past decade have been unsuccessful.60 In 
2007, a then Florida state senator introduced a bill that would have 
more than doubled the number of Florida Supreme Court justices 
from seven to fifteen.61 This bill was irrefutably motivated by an 
 
 57. Lawlor, supra note 56, at 975. 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 996–1000 (proposing a self-proclaimed “court-packing plan” that 
would modify the timing of Supreme Court appointments); Jonathan Turley, Unpacking 
the Court: The Case for the Expansion of the United States Supreme Court in the Twenty-
First Century, 33 PERSPECTIVES POL. SCI. 155, 155 (2010) (arguing in favor of a nineteen-
member Supreme Court). 
 59. William E. Raftery, Up, Down, All Around: Legislative Proposals to Change State 
Supreme Court Compositions Gaining Popularity, JUDICATURE, Autumn 2016, at 6, 6–7; 
Russell Berman, Arizona Republicans Try to Bring Back Court-Packing, ATLANTIC (May 
10, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/court-packing-enjoys-a-
political-renaissance/481758/ [https://perma.cc/KP9K-NYUG]. According to Raftery, in 
the 1980s and 1990s, there were five successful state-level modifications to the number of 
sitting justices in Iowa, Minnesota, Connecticut, Oklahoma, and Nevada. See Raftery, 
supra, at 6–7. Referring to these efforts as “court-packing” laws, however, is tenuous 
considering the lack of any evidence indicating that these changes were politically 
motivated. See id. 
 60. See Bill Raftery, Over a Dozen Efforts to Alter Number of State Supreme Court 
Justices, Almost All Related to “Packing” the Courts, in Last Several Years, GAVEL TO 
GAVEL (Feb. 5, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/2013/02/05/over-a-dozen-efforts-to-alter-
number-of-state-supreme-court-justices-almost-all-related-to-packing-the-courts-in-last-several
-years/ [https://perma.cc/75YZ-8P8F]. 
 61. S.J. Res. 408, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007). 
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unfavorable Florida Supreme Court decision, given that the first page 
of the bill explicitly stated, 
[T]he Legislature of the State of Florida finds that the majority 
decision by the Florida Supreme Court .	.	. was specious in its 
posture regarding the doctrine of judicial restraint and was the 
equivalent of judicial activism in policymaking, and .	.	. the 
decision betrays a lack of respect on the part of the majority for 
the separation of state powers.62 
Similarly, in 2010, Iowa Republicans introduced House Joint 
Resolution 2012, which sought to triple the number of Iowa Supreme 
Court judges.63 Although the legislature’s political motivations were 
not stated plainly in the bill’s text, House Joint Resolution 2012 was 
proposed less than one year after the Iowa Supreme Court 
unanimously struck down the state’s same-sex marriage law64—a 
decision that was highly criticized by Republicans as an attempt to 
legislate from the bench.65 
South Carolina lawmakers have also contributed to the recent 
spike in court-packing attempts. In the 2013-2014 session, a 
Republican legislator introduced a constitutional amendment that 
would have expanded the state supreme court from five to seven 
judges.66 Because the South Carolina Constitution requires that the 
 
 62. Id. When Florida Senate Joint Resolution 408 became public, it was quickly 
withdrawn, with the bill’s sponsor claiming that it was only drafted in the first place 
because “a law student came up with the idea.” A Busy Week, FLA. POL. (Jan. 8, 2007), 
http://flapolitics.blogspot.com/2007/01/busy-week.html [https://perma.cc/9MC2-SGEJ]. 
 63. H.J. Res. 2012, 83d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2010) (proposing to increase 
the supreme court from three to nine justices). 
 64. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (“We are firmly convinced 
the exclusion of gay and lesbian people from the institution of civil marriage does not 
substantially further any important governmental objective. The legislature has excluded a 
historically disfavored class of persons from a supremely important civil institution 
without a constitutionally sufficient justification.”). 
 65. See Mallory Simon, Iowa Voters Oust Justices Who Made Same-Sex Marriage 
Legal, CNN (Nov. 3, 2010, 1:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/11/03/iowa
.judges/ [https://perma.cc/26GF-CDE7]. 
 66. H.J. Res. 3090, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 120th Sess. (S.C. 2013). Although this marked 
the first time that a Republican had brought this issue before the legislature, the same 
Democratic senator had introduced this exact bill in nearly “every legislative session in 
South Carolina for almost two decades.” Bill Raftery, For 2 Decades SC Senate Dem Tried 
to Expand Supreme Court From 5 to 7, Now it is a House Republican Trying to do the 
Same in 2013, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 2, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/2013/01/02/for-2-
decades-sc-senate-dem-tried-to-expand-supreme-court-from-5-to-7-now-it-is-a-house-
republican-trying-to-do-the-same-in-2013/ [https://perma.cc/Y3WE-SGR3]. 
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state supreme court judges be elected by the General Assembly,67 
some observers have classified the proposal as “self-interested.”68 
Conversely, other states have (unsuccessfully) attempted to pass 
court “un-packing” plans that seek to decrease the number of state 
supreme court judges for political gain.69 In 2011, for example, 
Montana’s House Bill 245 proposed to reduce the number of 
Montana Supreme Court judges from seven to five.70 Again, 
legislators were transparent regarding their intentions, as House Bill 
245’s Republican author candidly argued that reducing the number of 
justices would lead to a higher caseload, thereby allowing the 
supreme court to become the legislature’s “ally in tort reform.”71 
Similarly, in 2013, Republican senators in Washington state sought to 
reduce the number of state supreme court justices from nine to five.72 
By directly citing to the court’s controversial decisions, legislators 
made clear that their intent was to “punish the Court for performing 
its requisite check upon political power.”73 One critic observed, 
To the justices in Olympia, Washington the message of the 
“court unpacking plan” is clear: if you render decisions which 
are unpopular, or which are at least unpopular along a 
particular portion of the political spectrum, you may lose your 
job and, worse, the cherished institution for which you work 
may lose its freedom to issue rulings without fear or favor, even 
when those rulings deprive powerful political forces of the 
victories they seek.74 
 
 67. See S.C. CONST., art. V, §	3. 
 68. John L. Warren III, Holding the Bench Accountable: Judges Qua Representatives, 
6 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 299, 324 (2014). 
 69. See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, A “Court Unpacking Plan” Threatens Judicial 
Independence, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org
/analysis/%E2%80%9Ccourt-unpacking-plan%E2%80%9D-threatens-judicial-independence 
[https://perma.cc/3EJS-L623]. 
 70. H.R. 245, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011). 
 71. Provide for Reduction in Size of Supreme Court: Hearing on H.B. 245 Before the 
H. Comm. on Judiciary, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. at 6:55 (Mont. 2011) (Statement of Rep. 
Derek Skees, House District 4), http://montanalegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php
?view_id=21&clip_id=5406 [https://perma.cc/69TJ-MNXP]. Ultimately, even though 
Republican legislators agreed with the “broader point about the legislative branch being 
unnecessarily weak, particularly when it comes to state agencies under the executive 
branch,” the bill never made it out of committee. Dan Testa, Skees’ Court-Shrinking Bill 
Doesn’t Get Far, FLATHEAD BEACON (Jan. 25, 2011), http://flatheadbeacon.com/2011/01
/25/skees-court-shrinking-bill-doesnt-get-far/ [https://perma.cc/Q4H4-F3R6]. 
 72. S.B. 5867, 63rd Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013). 
 73. Cohen, supra note 69. 
 74. Id. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1126 (2018) 
2018] COURT-PACKING IN NORTH CAROLINA 1139 
In sum, although none of these bills were ever signed into law, 
the increasing number of state-level proposals nonetheless signals an 
important change in attitudes towards court-packing generally. Like 
Roosevelt’s plan, the majority of these proposals were fueled by 
transparent political motivations. Yet, the same widespread, hostile 
public reaction that greeted the 1937 proposal now seems to be 
lacking. These failed attempts also indicate that legislators are far less 
hesitant to support and defend these purportedly controversial bills 
than previously believed, which may signal an even broader shift in 
general attitudes towards the usurpation of judicial power. 
2.  Georgia and Arizona’s 2016 Laws 
Eventually, after nearly a decade of unsuccessful state court-
packing proposals, two 2016 state court-packing laws were passed 
within days of each other, both of which increased their respective 
state supreme courts by two justices. On May 3, 2016, Georgia 
Governor Nathan Deal signed House Bill 927 into law, thereby 
expanding the Supreme Court of Georgia from seven justices to 
nine.75 Fifteen days later, Arizona followed suit, increasing the 
number of Arizona Supreme Court seats from five to seven upon the 
signing of House Bill 2537.76 
Although these two laws were structured differently,77 both were 
Republican-fueled efforts primarily supported by a similar 
justification: judicial efficiency. Proponents of Georgia’s law claimed 
that the state’s projected population increase necessitated an 
expanded court system in order to “keep pace with the demands of a 
fast-growing state.”78 Similarly, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey 
asserted that House Bill 2537 “puts Arizona on par with states that 
 
 75. Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of 2016, No. 626, sec. 4-1, §	15-2-1.1, 2016 Ga. 
Laws 883, 890 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §	15-2-1.1 (West, Westlaw through Act 284 of 
the 2018 Leg. Sess.)); Greg Bluestein, Georgia Governor’s Influence on State’s Judiciary 
Set to Expand, ATLANTA J-CONST. (May 3, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.myajc.com/news
/state-regional-govt--politics/georgia-governor-influence-state-judiciary-set-expand
/iAG6PGXGhF9GohtiBAMcvK/ [https://perma.cc/K84Z-TY5A]. 
 76. Act Amending Section 12-101, Arizona Revised Statutes; Relating to the Supreme 
Court, ch. 333, sec. 1, §	12-101, 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2552, 2552 (codified at ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-101 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 2018 of Second Reg. Sess)); see also 
Letter from Douglas A. Ducey, Governor of Ariz., to Michele Reagan, Sec’y of State of 
Ariz. 1–2 (May 18, 2016), http://azgovernor.gov/sites/default/files/hb_2537_signing
_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NRJ-4X4F]. 
 77. While Georgia’s increase “was part of a larger bill that restructured the 
jurisdiction, practice, and procedures” of the entire judiciary, Arizona’s was limited to 
adding more supreme court justices. Raftery, supra note 59, at 7. 
 78. Bluestein, supra note 75. 
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have similar or smaller resident populations, yet more Supreme Court 
justices,” noting that “more voices will ensure that the court can 
increase efficiency, hear more cases, and issue more opinions.”79 
Despite these comparable rationales, Georgia’s law received 
more support than Arizona’s, both from the courts and Democratic 
legislators. On one end, Georgia’s chief justice was “delighted” by the 
prospect of having “more eyes and ears and minds that look at an 
issue.”80 In contrast, Chief Justice Scott Bales from Arizona urged the 
Governor to veto the bill because “[a]dditional justices are not 
required by the Court’s caseload, and an expansion of the Court .	.	. is 
not warranted when other court-related needs are underfunded.”81 
Moreover, while Arizona’s law passed by a narrow 51-38 margin,82 
Georgia’s law was adopted by a bipartisan vote of 156-63.83 
Opponents of both laws, however, were outspoken. Georgia’s 
Senate Minority Leader Steve Henson claimed the law was a “power 
grab” by the Governor and that it reflected “a national trend 
[towards] making the judiciary more of a political playground.”84 And 
given that a majority of the supreme court’s sitting justices “were 
appointed by a Democrat,”85 Senator Henson’s claim that the Georgia 
legislature was “trying to pack the court .	.	. for political reasons”86 
 
 79. Letter from Douglas A. Doucey to Michele Reagan, supra note 76. 
 80. Bluestein, supra note 75. 
 81. Letter from Scott Bales, Chief Justice, Ariz. Supreme Court, to Douglas Ducey, 
Governor of Ariz. (May 5, 2016), https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http:
//archive.azcentral.com/persistent/icimages/politics/ScottBalesvetoletter05052016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/45GD-T2J3]. 
 82. See Voting Record for AZ HB2537, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/AZ/votes
/HB2537/2016 [https://perma.cc/C6PF-JAQJ]. Notably, this vote nearly mimics the 
partisan divide within the Arizona legislature: as of 2016, there were thirty-eight 
Democratic legislators and fifty-two Republican legislators. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATORS, STATE & LEGISLATIVE PARTISAN COMPOSITION (2016 
ELECTION) (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Legis_Control_2016
_Post12_15_11am.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ46-M89Y]. 
 83. See 2015-2016 Regular Session - HB 927, GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20152016/HB/927 [https://perma.cc/CZY3
-5TYA]. And, since Georgia had eighty Democratic legislators at the time, see NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 82, House Bill 927 necessarily 
received bipartisan support. 
 84. Bluestein, supra note 75. 
 85. Ian Millhiser, Governor Wants to Pack Georgia Supreme Court and Give 
Republicans a Majority, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 6, 2015, 4:42 PM), https://thinkprogress.org
/governor-wants-to-pack-georgia-supreme-court-and-give-republicans-a-majority-41df9abaf1ae/ 
[http://perma.cc/AQS4-NLM]. 
 86. Kristina Torres, Expansion of Georgia’s Supreme Court Wins Final Approval, 
ATLANTA J-CONST. (Mar. 22, 2016, 10:16 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-
govt--politics/expansion-georgia-supreme-court-wins-final-approval/skmjVHCCo80HW
4hXZKL6rM/ [http://perma.cc/5PR8-LAN2]. 
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was not completely unfounded. In Arizona, a Democratic state 
senator similarly stated that the “only reason” for the law was to 
enable the Governor to “stack the Supreme Court with his picks.”87 
Other House Bill 2537 adversaries went even further, calling on the 
legislature to “resist the temptation to pack the Arizona Supreme 
Court” and noting its “corrosive potential” on the independence of 
the judiciary and the system of checks and balances.88 These critics 
also admonished its projected financial burden—nearly $1 million—
on Arizona taxpayers.89 
Yet, even in light of these criticisms, both Arizona and Georgia 
achieved what Florida, Iowa, South Carolina, Montana, Washington, 
and other state court-packing proponents could not. While the 
practical effects of these two laws are yet to be seen, they nonetheless 
provide guidance for future state court-packing plans—especially in 
similarly situated states like North Carolina.90 
II.  NORTH CAROLINA’S JUDICIAL COMPOSITION 
North Carolina is unique in the context of the court-packing 
debate in that, although court-packing legislation has not been 
enacted, rumors of state supreme court expansion have provided for a 
fairly extensive discussion of the necessity and desirability of such a 
law. Moreover, the significant changes to the North Carolina judicial 
election processes that have occurred in recent years indicate that the 
North Carolina General Assembly is both willing and able to pass 
court-packing legislation, with or without the support of the other two 
branches. Accordingly, even though the likelihood of a North 
Carolina court-packing plan has decreased since Democratic 
Governor Roy Cooper was elected in November 2016,91 the North 
Carolina court-packing threat remains imminent. 
 
 87. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Gov. Doug Ducey Signs Legislation to Expand Arizona 
Supreme Court, AZCENTRAL (May 18, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/story
/news/politics/arizona/2016/05/18/gov-doug-ducey-signs-legislation-expand-arizona-supreme-
court/84544008/ [http://perma.cc/S3TJ-QYEJ]. 
 88. Editorial Board, Our View: Arizona’s Supreme Court Expansion is About 1 Thing, 
AZCENTRAL (Apr. 3, 2016, 10:20 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/editorial
/2016/04/04/arizona-supreme-court-expansion/82491766/ [http://perma.cc/6G8H-6LSM]. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See infra Section III.A.2. 
 91. See infra Section II.D.1. 
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A. Constitutional Bases for the North Carolina Judiciary 
The most fundamental court-packing question is whether there 
exists a constitutional basis for supreme court expansion.92 For the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina, the answer is straightforward. 
Article IV, Section 6 of the North Carolina Constitution states, “[t]he 
Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and six Associate 
Justices, but the General Assembly may increase the number of 
Associate Justices to not more than eight.”93 Thus, since the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina is currently comprised of seven total 
members,94 two seats may be added without the need for a 
constitutional amendment. 
An equally important question is whether the North Carolina 
Constitution specifies how newly-created Supreme Court of North 
Carolina seats would be filled. According to Article IV, Section 19, all 
judicial vacancies “shall be filled by appointment of the Governor, 
and the appointees shall hold their places until” the next General 
Assembly election held at least sixty days after the vacancy occurs.95 
In 2001, the Supreme Court of North Carolina clarified that the 
creation of new judgeships constitutes a “vacancy” within the 
meaning of this constitutional provision.96 Thus, again, this answer is 
clear: although new supreme court positions would ultimately be 
filled via democratic election, the initial duty of appointment is vested 
in the North Carolina Governor.97 
The size and scope of North Carolina’s judicial landscape, 
however, underwent substantial changes before it reached its current 
 
 92. If, for example, the state’s constitution imposes a maximum number of seven 
supreme court justices, but the legislature seeks to increase the number of justices to nine, 
then this increase must be done via constitutional amendment. In contrast, if the 
constitution either provides a higher maximum number or imposes no limit on the number 
of supreme court justices, then the legislature may expand the size of the court without 
going through the more onerous constitutional amendment process. 
 93. N.C. CONST. art. IV, §	6. Although this constitutional provision has 
(coincidentally) remained unchanged since 1937, this was not always the case. From 1818 
to 1868, the constitution only provided for three judges, until the 1868 constitution 
increased the number to five. JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONSTITUTION WITH HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 106 (1993). In 1876, the court was 
reduced for the first and only time back down to its original three members. Id. In the 
years following, the size of the Supreme Court of North Carolina was increased to five in 
1888, and then again to seven in 1937. Id. 
 94. Supreme Court of North Carolina, N.C. CT. SYS., http://www.nccourts.org/courts
/appellate/supreme/ [http://perma.cc/7WGU-5WJN]. 
 95. N.C. CONST. art. IV, §	19. 
 96. Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 549, 556 S.E.2d 265, 268–69 (2001). 
 97. The caveats of the Governor’s appointment power are discussed further in Section 
II.D.3. 
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form. The North Carolina Court of Appeals originally arose as a 
response to the state’s overworked judicial branch from 1917 to 
1957—a period that has been described as “a figurative nightmare” 
for North Carolina courts.98 In 1955, to remedy the “feebly 
modernized” judiciary, the North Carolina Bar Association created 
the Committee on Improving and Expediting the Administration of 
Justice in North Carolina.99 Three years later, this Committee issued a 
report (the “Bell Report”) that raised concerns over the caseload of 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which had increased from 
approximately forty opinions per justice to fifty per justice in just a 
few years.100 Since litigation was projected to increase “possibly more 
rapidly than population,” the Committee concluded that the 
establishment of an intermediate appellate court was the most 
effective solution.101 Consequently, in 1967, the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals was created.102 
B.  Current Workload of the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
Ironically, the Bell Report’s solution to an overworked supreme 
court may have been too effective. Although the workload of the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has been the subject of criticism 
over the past several years, these complaints have not stemmed from 
an unmanageably high number of cases passing through the 
courtroom doors. On the contrary, the declining number of opinions 
issued by the court each year has been the central concern of the 
court’s critics. 
 
 98. James W. Narron & John R. Hess, A Brief History of Judicial Reform and the 
District Court in North Carolina, N.C. B. ASS’N 5 (2016), https://www.ncbar.org/media
/721091/a-brief-history-of-judicial-reform-and-the-district-court-in-north-carolina.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/23XK-QCKU]. During this time, the North Carolina legislature “passed 
111 acts relating to the jurisdiction of lower courts, 144 to modify lower court procedures, 
and 25 to abolish previously constituted courts in their entirety.” Id. 
 99. Id. at 5. 
 100. Id. at 9. From 1953 to 1957, the Supreme Court of North Carolina wrote 348 
opinions per year, which totaled approximately fifty per justice—a substantial increase 
from prior years in which these judges were only issuing about forty opinions per year. Id. 
 101. Id. at 10. 
 102. JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL M. NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONSTITUTION 131 (2d ed., 2013). Notably, while the Committee did “recommend that 
the General Assembly be authorized to increase the number of Associate Justices to not 
more than eight,” it also emphasized the importance of the supreme court not becoming 
“so large as to be unwieldy or subject to undue fragmentation of opinion.” N.C. BAR 
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON IMPROVING AND EXPEDITING THE ADMIN. OF JUST. 
IN N.C. 10 (1958) [hereinafter BELL REPORT], http://nccalj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016
/01/Report_Improving_and_Expediting.-12.1958.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NME-KJ9H]. 
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In 2011, former Supreme Court of North Carolina Justice Robert 
Orr wrote an article addressing the “growing level of concern and 
confusion” over the supreme court’s diminishing workload.103 In his 
article Orr pointed out the “numerical imbalance” between the recent 
yearly caseloads of the court of appeals and supreme court, noting 
that “as the number of cases decided by the court of appeals 
continues to be in the thousands, the number of cases decided by the 
supreme court has dramatically dropped.”104 The former justice 
attributed this disparity in part due to “a massive resistance on the 
part of the [supreme] court” to review cases involving substantial 
constitutional questions.105 
Three years later, North Carolina Lawyers Weekly similarly 
noted that the “data backs up the perception that the [Supreme Court 
of North Carolina’s] output has been declining.”106 The analysis 
concluded that “the court has been issuing far too few opinions in 
recent years, and that needs to change,” noting how “[t]he lack of 
precedent from the court means less guidance for lower courts about 
how to interpret state laws, and more uncertainty for lawyers trying to 
litigate cases.”107 The article, however, did hypothesize that “a 
reversal of the trend may be in the offing” based on the passage of 
several new laws and the increased attention to this issue during the 
campaign season.108 
Coincidental or not, as of 2017, the number of signed supreme 
court opinions109 issued per year is no longer decreasing. According to 
the North Carolina Courts Statistical and Operational Summaries, the 
 
 103. Robert Orr, What Exactly is a “Substantial Constitutional Question” for Purposes 
of Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court?, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 211, 238 (2010). 
 104. Id. at 217. 
 105. Id. at 222. Orr also noted that fewer dissenting court of appeals’ opinions (since 
the supreme court is required to review cases in which the appeals decision was not 
unanimous) and a drop in death penalty cases may explain the diminishing caseload of the 
supreme court. Id. at 218. 
 106. David Donovan, Diminished Return: A Look at Recent State Supreme Court Cases 
Shows that the Court’s Output of Opinions Has Declined, N.C. LAW. WKLY. (Sept. 22, 
2014), http://nclawyersweekly.com/2014/09/22/diminished-return-a-look-at-recent-state-
supreme-court-cases-shows-that-the-courts-output-of-opinions-has-declined [http://perma.cc
/3ZSV-XW4G]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Per curiam opinions—“cases where the justices simply endorsed either the 
majority or dissenting opinion from the Court of Appeals,” id.—were excluded because 
they were not actually authored by the supreme court justices. 
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number of signed opinions nearly doubled in just two fiscal years.110 
Table 1 shows the number and type of supreme court opinions issued 
from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2017. 
 
Supreme Court of North Carolina Opinions111 
Date Signed Opinions 
Average per  
Judge 
07/01/2012–
06/30/2013 
31 4–5  
07/01/2013–
06/30/2014 
21 3 
07/01/2014–
06/30/2015 
29 4–5 
07/01/2015–
06/30/2016 
40 5–6 
07/01/2016–
06/30/2017 
40 5–6 
 
Table 1 
 
However, the trajectory of this trend remains uncertain, 
especially in light of the newly adopted en banc procedure for the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals, which is likely to further diminish 
 
 110. As specified in Table 1, these summaries measure the number of opinions by fiscal 
year, not calendar year, meaning they start on July 1 and end on June 30 the following 
year. 
 111. N.C. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., STAT. AND OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR APP. 
CTS.: 2016–17, at 7 http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SRPlanning/Documents/2016-
17_appellate_courts_statistical_and_operational_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D53F-U853 
(staff-uploaded archive)]; N.C. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., STAT. AND OPERATIONAL 
REPORT FOR APP. CTS.: 2015–16, at 7, http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SRPlanning
/Documents/2015-16_appellate_courts_statistical_and_operational_report.pdf [http://perma.cc
/8PXF-THC5]; N.C. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., STAT. AND OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR 
APP. CTS.: 2014–15, at 7–8, http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SRPlanning/Documents/2014-
15_appellate_courts_statistical_and_operational_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/33H9-HJEM]; 
N.C. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., STAT. AND OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR APP. CTS.: 2013–
14, at 7, http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SRPlanning/Documents/2013-14_appellate_courts
_statistical_and_operational_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/JZK8-GPKW] [hereinafter 2013-
2014 NCAOC REPORT]; N.C. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., STAT. AND OPERATIONAL 
REPORT FOR APP. CTS.: 2012–13, at 7–8, http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SRPlanning
/Documents/2012-13_appellate_courts_statistical_and_operational_report.pdf [http://perma.cc
/UD2V-7VU2]. 
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the supreme court’s caseload.112 Moreover, even assuming that the 
current pattern continues, it would still take decades for the supreme 
court’s caseload to reach a volume comparable to that of the Bell 
Report-era. 
C. Legislative Changes to North Carolina’s Judicial Elections 
Aside from the secrecy surrounding the alleged 2013 court-
packing attempt by Republican members of the North Carolina 
Senate Rules Committee,113 most of the current legislature’s other 
controversial changes have not gone unnoticed. Since Republicans 
took control of the North Carolina General Assembly in 2011, “key 
provisions of the state’s sharp political swing to the right have been 
challenged in state and federal court.”114 And although many of these 
challenges were unrelated to the state’s judicial branch,115 they 
nonetheless indicate that the General Assembly is both willing and 
able to make drastic, controversial changes. 
 
 112. Order Adopting Rule 31.1 of Appellate Procedure, 369 N.C. __, __ (Dec. 22, 2016) 
(adopting procedure for rehearing en-banc). In December of 2016, the North Carolina 
General Assembly passed Senate Bill 4, which abolished the “appeal of right” to the 
supreme court in superior court and court of appeals cases involving facial constitutional 
challenges. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22(b), §	7A-27, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-27 (2017)); see also John V. Orth, Recent Developments 
in North Carolina Property Law: Where’s the Supreme Court of North Carolina?, 95 N.C. 
L. REV. 1561, 1566–67 (2017). Under this new bill, superior court cases that were 
traditionally routed directly to the supreme court will now first be heard by the court of 
appeals. Id. Accordingly, this change—although beneficial in some respects—will likely 
result in a higher court of appeals caseload and lower supreme court caseload. See id. at 
1595. 
 113. See Warren, supra note 68, at 324 (“Less candidly, Republican members of the 
North Carolina Senate Rules committee attempted to expand the breadth of a pending 
Senate Bill, SB 10, to increase the size of the North Carolina Supreme Court from seven 
members to nine members.” (citing Raftery, supra note 5)); supra text accompanying 
notes 7–9. 
 114. Annie Blythe, A Judge, a Vegas Phone Call and the NC GOP Legislative Effort to 
Remake the Judicial Branch, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 26, 2017, 4:59 PM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article168661047.html 
[http://perma.cc/XT3Q-WWWN]. As a result of these challenges, legislators have spent 
over $13 million on legal representation. Id. 
 115. Courts have, for instance, reviewed the legislature’s attempts to ban same-sex 
marriage, strip teachers of tenure, require doctors providing abortions to perform an 
ultrasound and describe the sonogram image in detail, allow magistrates to opt out of 
performing same-sex marriages, requiring people in schools and other government 
facilities to use bathrooms matching the gender on their birth certificates, establish school 
voucher programs, and offer pro-choice messages on license plates. Annie Blythe, Courts 
are Roadblocks to NC Lawmakers’ Right Turn, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 21, 2016, 11:10 
PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article96889712.html 
[http://perma.cc/SD9Y-8UGN]. 
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1.  Retention Election Law 
Perhaps the most controversial law proposing to modify the 
state’s judicial election process over the past several years was House 
Bill 222 (the “retention election law”). Proposed in March 2015, the 
first version of the bill provided that supreme court justices and court 
of appeals judges “who [were] elected to that office at the most recent 
election” and were running for re-election would “be subject to 
approval by nonpartisan ballot at the general election immediately 
preceding the expiration of the term.”116 If the majority of the votes 
were in favor of the justice’s retention, then they would be retained 
for another term of eight years.117 If the justice received more 
“against” votes, however, the seat was considered vacant, meaning 
that the Governor would appoint someone to fill the seat until the 
next election.118 
If the first version of House Bill 222 had been adopted, the 
retention election process would have applied to five incumbent 
judges in the 2016 election: supreme court Justice Robert “Bob” 
Edmunds and appellate court Judges Bob Hunter, Richard Dietz, 
Valerie Zachary, and Linda Stephens.119 Of these five incumbents, 
court of appeals Judge Linda Stephens was the only one “tied to 
Democrats.”120 A revised copy of House Bill 222, however, limited the 
bill’s scope solely to supreme court justices,121 meaning that Judge 
Stephens would face a contested 2016 election––notably, against Phil 
Berger, Jr., the son of North Carolina Senate Leader Phil Berger.122 
Republican Governor Pat McCrory signed this revised version into 
law in June 2015.123 
The new retention election process, however, was short-lived. 
Several months after House Bill 222 became law, it was challenged as 
facially unconstitutional.124 In March 2016, a three-judge panel of the 
 
 116. H.B. 222, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (as passed 1st House 
reading, Mar. 12, 2015). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 95–97. 
 119. See Colin Campbell, Four Incumbents Face Challengers on NC Court of Appeals, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 23, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics
-government/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-dome/article51126580.html [http://perma.cc
/ZR4X-RD23]. 
 120. Id. 
 121. H.B. 222, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (as engrossed, June 1, 2015). 
 122. Campbell, supra note 119. 
 123. Act of June 11, 2015, ch. 65, §	7A-4.1, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 149, 149 (2015) 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-4.1 (2017)). 
 124. Faires v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 15CVS15903, 2016 WL 865472, at *1 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2016).  
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Wake County Superior Court found the law unconstitutional, 
concluding that a “retention election is not an ‘election’	.	.	. as 
required by the constitution” and that the law added “an additional 
qualification for the office of supreme court justice that the candidate 
must be the incumbent justice.”125 The government immediately 
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, but 
the six deciding justices were split evenly on the issue.126 This 
deadlock ultimately resulted in a per curiam opinion upholding the 
superior court decision.127 Accordingly, because this opinion was 
issued in May 2016, the retention election process was not in place 
during the November 2016 supreme court election. 
2.  Party Affiliation Laws 
Conservative legislators in support of the retention election law 
claimed that this change would help keep “partisanship out of 
Supreme Court elections.”128 Yet, the selectiveness of this rationale is 
made clear when viewed in conjunction with other legislation passed 
during the 2015 legislative session. House Bill 8, also introduced in 
2015, provided that political party affiliations must be listed next to 
the names of all prospective court of appeals judges—but not 
supreme court justices—on election ballots.129 This bill was signed 
into law in October 2015, and, unlike the retention election law, 
remained in effect during the 2016 election.130 
But after incumbent (Republican) Justice Edmunds lost his 
supreme court seat in the 2016 election,131 the legislature felt it 
immediately necessary to expand House Bill 8’s scope. Just five weeks 
after Democrats gained a 4-3 majority on the supreme court, the 
General Assembly passed Senate Bill 4, which extended the new 
 
 125. Id. at *1–2. In North Carolina, “[a] suit that makes a ‘facial challenge’ to the 
constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is heard by a special three-judge 
superior court.” Orth, supra note 112, at 1566. 
 126. Because Justice Edmunds recused himself from the case, it was decided by six, 
rather than seven, justices. See Faires v. State Bd. of Elections, 368 N.C. 825, 825, 784 
S.E.2d 463, 464 (2016) (per curiam). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Melissa Price Kromm, NC Retention Law Simply a Move to Guarantee 
Conservative Court, NEWS & OBSERVER (June 18, 2015, 5:16 PM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article24904384.html [http://perma.cc/MC2N
-MCGL]. 
 129. Act of Oct. 29, 2015, ch. 292, sec. 2, §	163-323, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 1461, 1461–62 
(2015) (repealed 2017). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See North Carolina Supreme Court Results: Michael Morgan Wins, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 1, 2017, 11:26 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/north-carolina-
supreme-court-justice-edmunds-seat [http://perma.cc/946F-3CPP (dark archive)]. 
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party affiliation law to elections for the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina.132 Yet, Republican lawmakers maintained that this change 
was wholly unrelated to the unseating of Edmunds––even despite the 
bill’s post-election timing, the fact that this change “had to be taken 
up in a special session outside the traditional legislative process,” and 
the lack of any indication that lawmakers originally sought to include 
the supreme court in House Bill 8.133 
Again, several months later, in March 2017, the legislature 
passed House Bill 100, thereby extending the party affiliation law 
even further.134 This new bill restored party primaries for superior 
court and district court elections	and required political affiliations on 
all trial court election ballots.135 Predictably, this change encountered 
renewed Democratic opposition. Governor Roy Cooper openly 
opposed the bill and Republicans’ “divisive political agenda[,]” 
arguing that “judges should be elected based on experience and 
ability, not political party.”136 North Carolina judges also expressed 
concerns about the bill, noting its adverse impact on unaffiliated 
candidates and the lack of any added benefit to voters.137 Ultimately, 
however, Republicans were again successful, with House Bill 100 
even garnering enough support to survive Governor Cooper’s first 
legislative veto.138 
3.  Ballot Order Laws 
In July 2016, just months after the retention election law was 
deemed unconstitutional, the North Carolina General Assembly 
made yet another modification to the state’s judicial election process 
 
 132. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 21(c), (g), §§	163-107(b), 165.5(a)(4), 2016 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 10, 26, 29–30 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	163A-980(b), 
1112(4) (2017)); Anne Blythe, NC Lawmakers Create Partisan Election Process for Courts 
that Review Their Laws, NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 17, 2016, 6:48 AM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article121449157.html 
[https://perma.cc/5XFJ-GBTR]. 
 133. See Blythe, supra note 132. According to Republican legislators, this change 
“simply allows the voters of North Carolina to simply make an informed choice.” Id. 
 134. See Act of Mar. 23, 2017, ch. 3, sec. 5, §	163-106, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, 2–3 
(2017) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	163A-974(a), -977(a) (2017)). 
 135. Id.; Craig Jarvis & Anne Blythe, Veto Override Means Voters Will Know Judges’ 
Party Affiliations, NEWS & OBSERVER (March 23, 2017, 7:19 PM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article140327188.html 
[https://perma.cc/TCB9-9C9J]. 
 136. Jarvis & Blythe, supra note 135. 
 137. See id. Specifically, Tom Lock, a superior court judge in Johnston County, stated, 
“I just don’t think that one piece of information says doodily squat about the judge or 
about their philosophy.” Id. 
 138. See Act of Mar. 23, 2017, sec. 5, §	163-106, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws at 2–3. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1126 (2018) 
1150 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
with Senate Bill 667. This new bill—passed during the second of five 
special legislative sessions held in 2016—provided that court of 
appeals candidates from all major parties should be arranged “in 
alphabetical order by party beginning with the party whose nominee 
for Governor received the most votes in the most recent 
gubernatorial election.”139 
Again, this change disadvantaged only one incumbent judge in 
the 2016 election: Democrat Linda Stephens. Based on the random 
selection process used by the state Board of Elections before the 
passage of Senate Bill 667, Judge Stephens’ name would have been 
listed first on the ballot.140 Under the new bill, however, her name 
would appear beneath that of her Republican challenger, Phil Berger, 
Jr.141 Unsurprisingly, Senate Bill 667 passed along strict party lines on 
the last day of the special session.142 
Of course, after Democrats gained control over the Governor’s 
Mansion in 2016,143 the new pro-incumbent ballot orders became far 
less appealing to prior Senate Bill 667 proponents. Accordingly, in 
March 2017, Republican legislators introduced House Bill 496, which 
would have restored the randomized ballot name order process that 
was in place prior to Senate Bill 667.144 The sponsor of House Bill 496 
justified this 180-degree change-of-heart by claiming that random 
ballot order was “the fairest system that [the legislature] could come 
 
 139. Act of July 22, 2016, ch. 109, sec. 3, §	163-165.6(d1)(1), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 616, 
617 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	163A-1114(e)(1) (2017)). 
 140. See Patrick Gannon, Ballot Order Flip Would Put Republican’s Name First, NEWS 
& OBSERVER (July 7, 2016, 5:22 AM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-dome/article87979992.html [https://perma.cc
/M285-EUQT]. 
 141. See id. This ballot name demotion is considered a disadvantage based on empirical 
evidence indicating that being listed earlier on the ballot has a significant effect on the 
percentage of votes that a candidate receives—also known as the “ballot order effect”—
especially in elections for low-visibility offices. See, e.g., Yakov Avichai, Equity in Politics: 
Name Placement on Ballots, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 141, 143 (1979) (concluding that “all 
studies find that ballot position accounts in part for voters’ choices” and that “[t]he first 
position is most advantageous”); David Brockington, A Low Information Theory of Ballot 
Position Effect, 25 POL. BEHAV. 1, 11 (2003) (arguing that the ballot order effect is 
enhanced by a less informed electorate); John Pasek, et al., Prevalence and Moderators of 
the Candidate Name-Order Effect: Evidence from Statewide General Elections in 
California, 78 PUB. OPINION Q. 416, 433 (2014) (finding that the order of names on a 
ballot influenced California election outcomes). 
 142. Gannon, supra note 140. 
 143. See infra Section II.D.1. 
 144. An Act Regarding the Placement of Candidates on Official Election Ballots, H.B. 
496, sec. 1, §	163-165.6(c), 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). 
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up with.”145 Democratic critics, in contrast, saw House Bill 496 as “just 
another in a growing list of examples of how the NC GOP is trying to 
rig the system in their favor	.	.	.	at the expense of open and fair 
elections in North Carolina.”146 Ultimately, the bill passed the House 
but failed to receive enough support in the Senate,147 thereby 
reserving Democratic court of appeals candidates the first slot on the 
November 2018 election ballots (for the time being). 
In short, although legislative-made change to the judicial branch 
is hardly a novel or controversial concept, the fairly apparent partisan 
motivations behind these recent modifications render a North 
Carolina court-packing bill more probable than ever. The fact that the 
vast majority of these bills were successfully signed into law also 
reinforces both the willingness and the ability of the current North 
Carolina General Assembly to make swift, sweeping changes to the 
judicial branch.  
D. The November 2016 North Carolina Election 
1.  The Results 
The results of the November 2016 election proved North 
Carolina’s reputation as “one of the swingiest of the swing states”148 
truer than ever, with both Democrats and Republicans seeing 
surprising victories by razor-thin vote margins. The state’s 
gubernatorial election—“one of the country’s most volatile and 
expensive races”149—between incumbent Republican, Pat McCrory, 
and his Democratic challenger, Roy Cooper, was ultimately decided 
in favor of Cooper by a microscopic .22% margin.150 With this loss, 
 
 145. Colin Campbell, NC House OKs Random Ballot Order to Avoid Listing 
Democrats First in 2018, NEWS & OBSERVER (April 26, 2017, 3:03 PM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article146781374.html 
[https://perma.cc/RFV5-2XV4]. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See H.B. 496, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). 
 148. North Carolina Results, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22 AM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/north-carolina [http://perma.cc/9P7S-AFEE 
(dark archive)]. 
 149. Monica Davey & Alan Blinder, In North Carolina, a Governor’s Race is Too 
Close to Call, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics
/governors-races-statehouses-eric-holcomb.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3TJK-F75E (dark 
archive)]. 
 150. See 11/08/2016 Official General Election Results – Statewide (Council of State), 
N.C. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS & ETHICS ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 13, 2016, 10:42 AM), 
http://er.ncsbe.gov/?election_dt=11/08/2016&county_id=0&office=COS&contest=0 
[https://perma.cc/QE67-ZZMG]. Cooper defeated McCrory by less than 11,000 votes in an 
election with over 4.7 million. Id. 
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McCrory became the state’s first Governor since 1850 to be defeated 
for re-election in a regular, general election.151 
In contrast, when viewed in light of the ballot order and party 
affiliation laws, the court of appeals races were decided as one would 
expect. The three Republican incumbent court of appeals judges up 
for re-election (Judges Dietz, Hunter, and Zachary) each secured 
their seats with a comfortable 54% of the vote.152 The lone 
Democratic incumbent, however, was not as lucky. Linda Stephens—
listed last and designated as a Democrat on the ballot—lost her seat 
to challenger Phil Berger, Jr. by a less than .5% margin.153 Of the 
nearly 4.5 million votes cast, Berger defeated Stephens by 
approximately 22,000.154 When broken down by county, the majority 
of Berger’s losses were in urban and primarily African American 
counties.155 
Perhaps the most significant election result, however, was the 
race for the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The challenger, 
Michael “Mike” Morgan, defeated the incumbent, Justice Bob 
Edmunds, by over 350,000 votes—a near 10% margin of victory.156 
This conquest marked an ideological shift of the supreme court, 
ushering in a new era of Democratic majority.157 Even more surprising 
than the landslide results were the areas in which the African 
American Democratic candidate received support: despite winning 
 
 151. See John Wynne, No NC Governor has Lost Reelection Since 1892, POL. N.C. 
(Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.politicsnc.com/no-nc-governor-has-lost-reelection-since-1892/ 
[http://perma.cc/64GA-CKAP]. Notably, however, North Carolina’s constitution did not 
permit two-term Governors until 1977. Id. 
 152. See 11/08/2016 Official General Election Results – Statewide (Judicial), N.C. ST. 
BOARD ELECTIONS & ETHICS ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 13, 2016, 10:42 AM), 
http://er.ncsbe.gov/?election_dt=11/08/2016&county_id=0&office=JUD&contest=0 [https://perma.cc
/W5SA-VRYF]. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Doug Clark, Morgan’s Supreme Court Win was Helped by Lack of Party Label on 
the Ballot, NEWS & REC. (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.greensboro.com/blogs/clark_off_the
_record/morgan-s-supreme-court-win-was-helped-by-lack-of/article_7c179dea-a68c-11e6-
9682-7b8f40afd0f6.html [https://perma.cc/9ZKR-TEVP]; see 11/08/2016 Official General 
Election Results – Statewide (Judicial): NC Court of Appeals Judge (Stephens) (Vote for 1), 
N.C. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS & ETHICS ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 13, 2016, 10:42 AM), 
http://er.ncsbe.gov/contest_details.html?election_dt=11/08/2016&county_id=0&contest_id
=1198 [https://perma.cc/63CQ-GWHC]. 
 156. See North Carolina Supreme Court Results: Michael Morgan Wins, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 1, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/north-carolina-
supreme-court-justice-edmunds-seat [https://perma.cc/946F-3CPP (dark archive)]. Morgan 
received 2,134,650 votes, while Edmunds received 1,785,437. Id. 
 157. See Clark, supra note 155. 
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some heavily Republican counties, Morgan actually won fewer votes 
than other Democratic candidates in primarily Democratic areas.158 
2.  Explaining the Conflicting Outcomes 
Notwithstanding the historic nature of McCrory’s loss, the 
outcome of the gubernatorial election was somewhat anticipated. 
Even with experience, history, and a thriving economy on McCrory’s 
side, the state’s highly conservative and Republican-controlled 
legislature harmed the ex-Governor’s softer, “business conservative” 
image he had exerted during his 2012 gubernatorial campaign.159 
Indeed, polls conducted months before the election indicated that 
passage of the contentious H.B. 2 negatively influenced McCrory’s 
popularity,160 even though this law was a product of the General 
Assembly, rather than McCrory himself. 
But the contrasting results of North Carolina’s 2016 judicial 
elections—Berger’s narrow victory and Edmunds’ sweeping defeat—
cannot be explained by mere popularity. At the time of the 2016 
election, Democratic incumbent, Linda Stephens, had been on the 
court of appeals for more than a decade, had “earned a reputation as 
a thoughtful and no-nonsense judge,” and was credited with many 
accomplishments throughout her lengthy legal career in North 
Carolina.161 Further evidence of Stephens’s popularity can be found in 
 
 158. Id.; see 11/08/2016 Official General Election Results – Statewide (Judicial): NC 
Supreme Court Associate Justice (Vote for 1), N.C. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS & ETHICS 
ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 13, 2016, 10:42 AM), http://er.ncsbe.gov/contest_details.html
?election_dt=11/08/2016&county_id=0&contest_id=1393 [http://perma.cc/XK7S-D2MJ]. 
 159. Rob Christensen, Why NC’s First GOP Governor in a Generation Lost – 
Christensen, NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 11, 2016, 4:24 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com
/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/rob-christensen/article119693873.html 
[http://perma.cc/EYT8-NBPQ]. 
 160. See Prez and Senate Races Tight; HB2 Drag on Gov. McCrory Re-Elect Bid, 
MONMOUTH UNIV. POLLING INST. (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-
institute/reports/MonmouthPoll_NC_082416/ [http://perma.cc/TFV7-3D59] (finding that 
55% disapprove of H.B. 2 (72% of which were not voting for McCrory), 36% approve of 
HB 2 (74% of which were voting for McCrory), and 70% believe that H.B. 2 had harmed 
North Carolina’s national reputation). 
 161. Capital Broad. Co. Editorial, Stand Up to Legislative Ballot Rigging: Keep Linda 
Stephens on the N.C. Court of Appeals, WRAL (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.wral.com/stand-
up-to-legislative-ballot-rigging-keep-linda-stephens-on-the-n-c-court-of-appeals/16166704/ 
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her landslide 2008 victory, in which she received nearly 59% of the 
vote.162 In contrast, Stephens’s Republican challenger was the lesser-
known and less experienced candidate.163 In a 2014 primary for a 
North Carolina senate seat (Berger’s only prior attempt at running 
for office) the state senate leader’s son lost decisively after receiving 
less than 13,000 votes.164 
The 2016 supreme court candidates share more comparable 
backstories. Sixteen-year supreme court veteran, Bob Edmunds, had 
a lengthy and prestigious legal career in his home state.165 His 
challenger, Mike Morgan, also had extensive experience in the North 
Carolina judiciary, with twenty-one years spent as a superior court 
judge.166 But given Edmunds’s two prior electoral victories, as well as 
the 2016 primary election results, the incumbent Republican 
appeared to be the favored candidate.167 
Edmunds’s loss was therefore unanticipated by many analysts 
and political experts and left many searching for answers.168 Some 
 
the first female law clerk for Court of Appeals Judge Fred Hedrick, the first female 
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observers believed that the results stemmed simply from merit, based 
on a “campaign that pitted Edmunds’ record on the supreme court 
bench with Morgan’s record as a superior court judge.”169 
Alternatively, the fact that Morgan obtained endorsements from 
high-profile Democrats, including then President Barack Obama, may 
have contributed to his success.170 Still others opined that the 
enormous amount of money spent on the campaign—over $5 
million—was influential, especially since one liberal super PAC 
“spent over $1.7 million opposing Edmunds.”171 
But when viewed in conjunction with the court of appeals race, it 
is unlikely that these factors alone were responsible for Morgan’s 
unexpected victory. Because neither the ballot order law nor the 
party affiliation law applied to the 2016 supreme court election, 
Morgan’s name was listed first on the ballot, and voters were not 
provided with either candidate’s party affiliation.172 It therefore seems 
likely that some voters unfamiliar with either candidate assumed that 
the name listed first was Republican, meaning that those “voting 
Republican down the ballot simply became accustomed to filling in 
the top line and, as a result, voted for Morgan.”173 This conclusion is 
further bolstered by data indicating the unbranded Morgan was 
significantly more successful than Stephens in Republican counties 
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[https://perma.cc/55FP-Y8TS] (noting that North Carolinians were still “trying to decipher 
the reasons” for Morgan’s “curious” victory); Doug Clark, Surprising Court Outcome 
Might Have Been Accidental, NEWS & REC. (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.greensboro.com
/blogs/clark_off_the_record/doug-clark-surprising-court-outcome-might-have-been-accidental
/article_7a0b3361-92d1-5fea-b878-ffde9ed1a645.html [http://perma.cc/E698-KUE5] 
(describing Morgan’s victory as “perhaps the biggest surprise of a stunning election 
night”); John Trump, Ballot Placement May Have Aided Morgan’s Supreme Court Win, 
CAROLINA J. (Nov. 10, 2016, 4:10 AM), https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article
/ballot-placement-may-have-aided-morgans-supreme-court-win/ [https://perma.cc/JL4T-
77Q2] (explaining how Morgan’s victory “defied [] expectations” of political experts and 
analysts). 
 169. Cindy Kehler, Supreme Court Incumbent Ousted in North Carolina; Incumbents 
Prevail in Three Other Most-Watched State Supreme Court Races, BALLOTPEDIA (Nov. 10, 
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Spending Records, FACING SOUTH (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.facingsouth.org/2017/02
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and considerably less successful in Democratic areas.174 Equally 
compelling is the fact that nearly 500,000 fewer North Carolinians 
voted in the supreme court race than they did for the court of 
appeals.175 This suggests that many voters who were unacquainted 
with either candidate simply forewent voting in the supreme court 
race altogether. 
This comparison therefore seems to be the most compelling 
indication of the General Assembly’s partisan influence on the state’s 
judicial composition. Had the retention election law been upheld, the 
result of the supreme court election may very well have been 
different: if Edmunds had received a majority of votes at the 
expiration of his term, Morgan would never have had the opportunity 
to challenge Edmunds. Moreover, had the ballot order law and party 
affiliation law not applied to the court of appeals race, the chances of 
Stephens being elected likely would have been much higher, as she, 
like Morgan, would have appeared first on the ballot without her 
party affiliation. Similarly, if these two laws had applied to the 
supreme court race—as they do now—the race would likely have 
been much closer. In sum, although the degree to which these laws 
affected the results of the 2016 judicial election remains unknown, the 
juxtaposition of Morgan’s victory and Stephens’s loss renders the 
legislature’s impact undeniable. 
3.  Impact on the North Carolina Court-Packing Debate 
Aside from providing concrete evidence of legislative 
interference, the 2016 election also impacted the North Carolina 
court-packing debate for a wholly separate reason. Now that a 
Democratic Governor holds both the legislative veto and the 
appointment power for all newly created judgeships, it would seem 
that the current, Republican-controlled General Assembly would be 
neither able nor willing to pass court-packing legislation. However, 
for several reasons, the practical impact of this change in power is 
likely much smaller than it seems. 
First, the post-2016 legislature has not deviated from its pre-
Cooper pattern of judicial interference—if anything, it has been even 
more emboldened to limit the Governor’s power. For example, in 
2017, the General Assembly passed House Bill 239, which eliminated 
 
 174. See supra notes 155, 158, and accompanying text. 
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three court of appeals justices,176 and Senate Bill 656, which abolished 
2018 judicial primary elections.177 Both of these laws were vetoed by 
Governor Cooper, and both of his vetoes—along with eight others—
were overridden by the legislature.178 Accordingly, it is clear that the 
General Assembly still maintains significant control over the state’s 
judicial landscape, even without an ally in the Governor’s Mansion. 
And because of the duration of Republicans’ control, their legislative 
agenda is flexible—i.e., they have the time to focus on these types of 
issues, rather than typical, “big-ticket” items.179 
Second, the legislature has shown no hesitation in attempting to 
curtail Governor Cooper’s appointment power. Indeed, through 
House Bill 239, the Governor’s court of appeals appointment power 
has already been limited. Before its passage, Cooper “was poised to 
appoint judges to fill at least two Appeals Court seats because of 
Republicans leaving due to mandatory retirement.”180 Now, upon 
those judges’ retirement, the seats will simply be eliminated 
altogether. Two other bills proposed in 2017, House Bills 240 and 24, 
would have completely removed Cooper’s appointment power for 
district courts and superior courts, respectively.181 
Relatedly, although Governor Cooper’s supreme court 
appointment power could not be officially eliminated without a 
constitutional amendment or reversal of supreme court precedent,182 
the passage of such a bill is not an unrealistic possibility. Already in 
2018, a constitutional amendment creating two-year term limits for all 
state judges and providing that “[a]ll terms of office for persons 
elected prior to July 1, 2018, to the office of Justice of the Supreme 
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Court, Judge of the Court of Appeals, or regular Judge of the 
Superior Court shall expire December 31, 2018” has been proposed.183  
Finally, even if the legislature is unable or unwilling to pass a 
constitutional amendment, it may still wish to create new supreme 
court seats, even if it means that Governor Cooper would temporarily 
fill them. Because the North Carolina Constitution provides that the 
Governor’s appointee shall only serve until the next General 
Assembly election, the legislature, with proper planning, could limit 
the Governor’s appointee to a term of only sixty-one days.184 
III.  PREREQUISITE CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE SUPREME COURT 
EXPANSION 
As evidenced by the widespread reactions to President 
Roosevelt’s proposal and the various state-level court-packing 
attempts over the past decade, successful court-packing legislation 
cannot rest on constitutional authority alone. To maintain public 
confidence in the judicial branch of government, those seeking to 
expand state supreme courts must first analyze several non-partisan 
objective factors, including: the practical necessity of additional 
justices, the cost to citizens, and the impact of court-packing 
legislation on judicial integrity. Without a careful analysis of these 
neutral factors, supreme court expansion will jeopardize the 
effectiveness and accountability of the judiciary, even if there is 
already constitutional authority for this change. 
In North Carolina, as explained in Section II.A, the 
constitutional basis for court-packing is a nonissue: the legislature 
may add two supreme court justices, to be appointed by the 
Governor, without amending the North Carolina Constitution.185 
However, the current workload of the supreme court, the financial 
state of the judicial branch, and the General Assembly’s pervasive 
interference nonetheless weigh strongly against the implementation 
of a North Carolina court-packing law. 
A. Practical Necessity of Additional Justices 
Determining whether additional justices are actually necessary to 
effectuate the fundamental goals of the judicial branch should be the 
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first consideration of any court-packing plan—not because it is the 
most imperative consideration, but simply because it may be 
dispositive. Of course, there are unique instances in which modifying 
the structure or size of the judiciary is the only conceivable solution to 
remedying extreme cases of judicial inefficiency. However, as 
exemplified by the Bell Report’s recommendation to create the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals, court-packing is rarely ever the only 
sufficient option.186 Accordingly, when evaluating the practical 
necessity of additional justices, several indicia should be thoroughly 
reviewed, including the workload of the court, the efficiency of the 
court, and the state’s population. 
Regarding North Carolina specifically, the relatively small 
workload of supreme court justices seems to weigh against the 
argument for adding more justices. In contrast, claims of judicial 
inefficiency and increasing population statistics appear, at first glance, 
to support analogous arguments made by Arizona and Georgia court-
packing proponents. These analogies break down, however, when the 
drastic population and structural differences between these three 
states are taken into account. 
1. Caseload, Judicial Efficiency, and Population Growth 
Perhaps the most obvious of the three “practical necessity” 
considerations is the workload of the court. An increase in the 
volume of litigation logically leads to justices spending more time 
hearing cases and writing opinions. If ignored, this pattern can 
eventually lead to an overworked court, the adverse affects of which 
extend beyond issues relating to inefficiency. Placing too much 
responsibility on judges may, for example, lead to decreased scrutiny 
of lower court decisions187 and greater reliance on subordinates for 
certain decision-making responsibilities.188 An increasing caseload 
may also compel courts “to choose how to increase their decision-
making capacity,”189 which can lead to many of these same adverse 
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 187. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 30–31 (2013). 
 188. See id. at 26. 
 189. Id. at xii. 
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results, as well as less time and effort being spent hearing and 
deciding cases and more per curiam (and, therefore, nonbinding) 
opinions.190 Relatedly, timely disposition of cases helps fill gaps in 
existing law. As alleged by Arizona court-packing proponents, the 
“uncertainty” that stems from “conflicting case law or a lack of 
precedent” may be remedied by the addition of justices because such 
expansion would provide the court with the means to hear cases that 
“warrant attention” without delay.191 
Measuring the sheer volume of cases that pass through 
courtroom doors, however, is not the only indicia of practical 
necessity. An increasing population—or simply projections of one—
may also be a relevant consideration. Proponents of Georgia’s court-
packing law, for example, placed great weight on this factor, 
reasoning that two additional Georgia Supreme Court seats were 
necessary to accommodate the purportedly imminent population 
boom.192 A similar rationale was cited in Arizona, with court-packing 
supporters noting, “A bigger court .	.	. could handle a bigger workload 
and perhaps better reflect the diversity of the state. Since Arizona’s 
Supreme Court was last expanded in 1960, the state has grown 
considerably—from a population of just over 1 million to nearly 7 
million.”193 
2.  The Practical Necessity of Additional Supreme Court of North 
Carolina Justices 
Applying these factors to North Carolina, if the workload and 
population patterns continue to increase at their current rate, this 
factor may eventually weigh in favor of supreme court expansion. 
However, based on current data, this expansion does not yet seem 
practically necessary. 
The workload of the supreme court seems to provide the 
strongest argument against the necessity of additional justices. As 
discussed in Section II.B, the number of opinions issued by the 
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supreme court has increased in recent years.194 From 2015 to 2016, the 
number of written opinions jumped from twenty-nine to forty, where 
it remained in 2017.195 From 2014 to 2016, this number practically 
doubled.196 However, the court’s caseload still does not appear to be 
within range of needing an additional two justices; for even with this 
recent increase, each justice is still only responsible for writing five to 
six opinions per fiscal year. If two more justices were added, this 
would decrease back to four or five opinions for each justice per year. 
This number is especially shocking when compared to the judges at 
the (recently downsized) North Carolina Court of Appeals, who 
currently average about 100 opinions per year.197 
Indeed, the supreme court’s low caseload may prove equally as 
harmful as an overcrowded docket. As explained by one North 
Carolina constitutional scholar, by failing to review lower court 
decisions, the supreme court is “effectively delegating [its] precedent-
setting function to panels of the intermediate appellate court.”198 
Because so many crucial constitutional issues have been ignored by 
the supreme court, the court of appeals has recently emerged as “the 
de facto court of last resort.”199 Aside from concerns of unfairness, 
this pattern is also problematic because it limits access to the judicial 
branch: “Facing the likelihood of adverse decisions in the trial and 
intermediate appellate courts, only well-resourced litigants adversely 
affected by a precedent set by a panel of the Court of Appeals will be 
able to seek the attention of the Supreme Court.”200 
In his 2015 State of the Judiciary address to the General 
Assembly, Chief Justice Martin expressed a similar sentiment, noting 
how budget shortfalls—not a shortage of justices—led to a “situation 
where the justice system is unable to promptly serve those who turn 
to us for help.”201 The Chief Justice also passionately noted, 
Our State Constitution guarantees that courts shall be open and 
that justice shall be administered without delay. Think about 
what it will mean if the people of this great State cannot rely on 
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us to promptly administer justice. How can we explain that to 
the victims of violent crime and their families? How can we 
explain that to the small-business owners who need a contract 
dispute resolved in order to keep their store open and avoid 
bankruptcy? How can we explain that to the family that lost a 
loved one because of a drunk driver? We must be able to 
provide them with justice.202 
Most notable about this address, however, is the fact that Chief 
Justice Martin never once mentioned supreme court expansion as a 
solution to this inefficiency. Of course, as shown through the Arizona 
legislature’s disregard of Chief Justice Bales’s objections, even direct 
recommendations from the judiciary are not always dispositive. 
However, ignoring a justice’s explicit recommendations for 
alternative solutions seems far more egregious than simply 
disregarding their ex post, general opinion. 
Nor do population statistics provide an adequate basis for 
supreme court expansion. Between 2015 and 2016, North Carolina 
saw its largest population increase in a single year since 2010,203 and 
the state is projected to grow even faster in the coming years, 
increasing by nearly eleven percent between 2010 and 2020.204 When 
taken independently, these statistics reveal an imminent growth in 
population, and, consequently, an imminent growth in caseload.  
However, when viewed in context of other relevant factors, these 
numbers are far less compelling. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, Georgia and North Carolina were “neck and neck” in terms 
of population in 2016, with North Carolina landing the number nine 
spot directly below Georgia.205 The two states also had nearly 
identical numeric population growth: North Carolina saw an increase 
of 111,602 citizens, and Georgia an increase of 110,973.206 This 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Rebecca Tippett, North Carolina Population Growth at Highest Levels Since 
2010, CAROLINA DEMOGRAPHY (Feb. 10, 2017), http://demography.cpc.unc.edu/2017/02
/10/north-carolina-population-growth-at-highest-levels-since-2010/ [https://perma.cc/Q3HF
-KPD8]. “The uptick in population growth was fueled by an increase in net migration: 
North Carolina received 81,000 net migrants between 2015 and 2016,” the fifth highest 
state rate. Id. 
 204. Rebecca Tippett, Population Growth in the Carolinas: Projected vs. Observed 
Trends, CAROLINA DEMOGRAPHY (Dec. 8, 2015), http://demography.cpc.unc.edu/2015/12
/08/population-growth-in-the-carolinas-projected-vs-observed-trends/ [https://perma.cc/HY6A-
NHC9]. 
 205. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Utah is Nation’s Fastest-Growing State, 
Census Bureau Reports (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases
/2016/cb16-214.html [https://perma.cc/RC3A-N7BZ]. 
 206. Id. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1126 (2018) 
2018] COURT-PACKING IN NORTH CAROLINA 1163 
similarity, however, becomes far less germane to the court-packing 
discussion when the caseloads of these states are compared. In stark 
contrast to the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s average of forty 
written opinions per year, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an 
average of 432 majority opinions annually between the years of 2013 
and 2015.207 Thus, the effect of an increasing population is far more 
likely to adversely affect already-overworked Georgia supreme court 
justices than those of North Carolina. Further, this comparison proves 
that when assessing the need for additional supreme court justices, a 
state’s current or expected population cannot be viewed in isolation; 
it must be considered in the context of other practical considerations. 
While an increasing population––and, eventually, an increasing 
caseload––may have decreased the efficiency of the Georgia Supreme 
Court, the same cannot be said for North Carolina’s highest court, in 
which a higher caseload would actually be beneficial, not harmful. 
North Carolina can also be distinguished from Arizona in this 
context. Again, when looking solely at the census statistics, it seems as 
though any population-based argument made by Arizona should 
surely extend to North Carolina. From 2015 to 2016, Arizona’s 
population jumped by 113,506—equating to a less than 2,000-person 
difference between its population and North Carolina’s population—
to a total of 6,931,071.208  
When evaluating how much weight to give these statistics, 
however, context is again determinative. Most notably, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina can be distinguished from the Arizona 
Supreme Court because the latter only had five justices prior to 
passing its court-packing legislation, while North Carolina currently 
has seven. This effectively means that the Arizona court-packing bill 
merely put the court in the same position as other states with 
comparable population growth rates. Moreover, despite their size 
differences, both the five-member Arizona Supreme Court and the 
seven-member Supreme Court of North Carolina have disposed of 
approximately the same percentage of cases in the past several years. 
In 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court only issued written opinions for 
about 2.9% of cases filed (31 out of 1,037).209 The Supreme Court of 
 
 207. GA. APP. JURISDICTION REV. COMM’N, 2016 REPORT 6 (2016), 
https://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.georgia.gov/files/related_files/press_release/Final__Appel
late%20Jurisdiction%20Review%20Commission%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/25U2-
HZQX]. 
 208. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 205. 
 209. ARIZ. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUS., supra note 191, at 1–2 (noting that 
the Arizona Supreme Court only issued written opinions for “31 of the 1,037 cases filed” 
in 2015). 
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North Carolina saw similar results in Fiscal Year 2013, in which it 
issued written opinions for 21 of the 657 petitions for review, totaling 
about 3.2%.210 Thus, even with this two-person difference, the two 
courts were equivalently effective. These discrepancies therefore 
indicate that changing the way in which North Carolina justices use 
their time, not the number of people sitting on the court, is the best 
way to remedy judicial inefficiency. 
B. Expense of Additional Justices 
A complementary factor that must be considered in the court-
packing context is the cost that additional justices would impose on 
the public and the judicial branch. Although this appears to be an 
ancillary, less-cited concern of court-packing proponents and 
opponents alike, it is nonetheless something that must be 
considered—especially in states where judicial funding is already 
scarce––because it is inextricably tied to the two other factors. 
1.  Adverse Financial Effects of Court-Packing 
Since the nation’s founding, the judiciary has been the most 
financially vulnerable branch of the government. As early as 1788, 
Alexander Hamilton cautioned that the federal judicial branch was 
“beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power” 
because it “has no influence over either the sword or the purse.”211 
Lately, as more states are struggling financially, these purses have 
been tightened—often at the expense of courts. According to 
comments by members of the ABA Task Force on the Preservation 
of the Justice System, which released a 2011 report regarding the 
general lack of funding for state courts, most state courts decreased 
funding by ten to fifteen percent in the years following the 2008 
recession.212 Another 2014 study found similar results: between 2009 
and 2012, forty-three states reported budget cuts, forty states reported 
a budget shortfall, twenty-three states reduced court operating hours, 
 
 210. See 2013–2014 NCAOC REPORT, supra note 111, at 5, 7. 
 211. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 433–34 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 212. See Peter T. Grossi, Jr., Jon L. Mills & Konstantina Vagenas, Future Trends in 
State Courts 2012: Crisis in the Courts: Reconnaissance and Recommendations, 2012 NAT’L 
CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 83, http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2012
/home/Better-Courts/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends%202012/PDFs/Crisis
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and twenty-two raised court fees and fines.213 This data led the study’s 
authors to despondently conclude, “The sad reality facing America is 
that many of our state court systems are so poorly funded that they 
are at a tipping point of dysfunction.”214 
Accordingly, while the financial impact of two additional state 
supreme court justices may sound insignificant, this extra expense 
may actually have long-lasting consequences. When judicial branches 
cannot afford such expansion, their effectiveness and efficiency may 
be jeopardized by their inability to meet caseload demands and 
failure to modernize their technologies.215 Additionally, because 
judicial budgets “are typically 90 percent personnel expenses	.	.	. cuts 
to judicial budgets have had a debilitating impact on available court 
days and all of the other functions that require people to work 
immediately on burgeoning caseloads.”216 Thus, because courts 
encompass “such a small portion of a state government’s overall 
budget,” even the most minor of budget cuts may still “trigger 
significant governmental, social, and economic costs.”217 
Yet, as exemplified by the lack of data regarding the cost of 
Georgia’s court-packing bill, underfunded judiciaries remain largely 
unnoticed by both the public and the other branches of government, 
even despite the potentially destructive effects of this phenomenon.218 
There is no evidence indicating that Georgia’s House Bill 927 will be 
accompanied by a budgetary increase, nor is there any available 
estimate of the additional cost imposed on the state’s judicial branch. 
In fact, the Georgia Appellate Review Commission—which, in light 
of “[b]udget cuts, a docket backlog, and time constraints,” was tasked 
with recommending a “realignment” of Georgia’s appellate court 
system—considered but declined to include supreme court expansion 
 
 213. ERIC J. MAGNUSON, ET AL., DRI, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 8 (2014), 
http://www.dri.org/docs/default-source/dri-white-papers-and-reports/2014-economics-of-
justice.pdf?sfvrsn=10 [https://perma.cc/FTU6-A359]. 
 214. Id. at 2. 
 215. See EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, ENCJ REPORT 
2015-2016: FUNDING OF THE JUDICIARY 3–4 (2016), https://www.encj.eu/images/stories
/pdf/workinggroups/encj_2015_2016_report_funding_judiciary_adopted_ga.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7LV6-W5B2] (“To meet the present and future legitimate expectations of society, the 
judicial system must have the resources to innovate and modernize such as information 
and communication technology.”). 
 216. Grossi, Jr. et al., supra note 212, at 83. 
 217. MAGNUSON, ET AL., supra note 213, at 5. 
 218. Id. at 2. According to a 2013 national poll, only forty percent of respondents 
believed that state courts were underfunded. Id. 
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in its list of recommendations.219 Although the Commission did not 
expressly state that this decision was financially motivated, the 
enormous budgetary cuts to Georgia’s judicial branch in recent years 
seem to indicate that the diminished judicial resources played at least 
some role.220 
Arizona, in contrast, did at least address this factor in its court-
packing law discussions. According to Arizona court-packing 
proponents, the state’s new law will reportedly cost the state 
approximately $1 million—a “tiny fraction” of Arizona’s $9 billion 
budget, all of which would go solely towards judicial and staff 
salaries.221 Additionally, although Chief Justice Bales admonished the 
state’s court-packing plan, he indicated that because the Arizona 
judicial branch was underfunded, “he would support the expansion as 
part of a larger effort to increase court funding and judicial 
salaries.”222 Thus, in order to gain support from Chief Justice Bales 
and other anti-court-packing legislators, Arizona lawmakers passed a 
separate bill increasing funding for the Arizona Supreme Court and 
increasing the salaries of its judges by three percent over two years.223 
Accordingly, in Fiscal Year 2017, the Arizona Supreme Court’s 
budget was increased by $500,000 (plus the cost of two new full-time 
positions) to accommodate the two future justices, as well as $10,600 
for half of the judicial salary increase, equating to approximately 
0.1% of the supreme court’s total Fiscal Year 2017 budget.224 
 
 219. Bryan Janflone & Michael F. Williford, HB 927 - Supreme Court, Appellate Court 
Efficiencies, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 205, 207 (2016). In its report, the Commission detailed 
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supra note 207, at 6–9. 
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Georgia courts’ budgets by twenty-five percent”). “In 2010 and 2011, the state budget 
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of the two new justices. See ARIZ. LEGISLATURE, FISCAL YEAR 2017 APPROPRIATIONS 
REPORT: JUDICIARY - SUPREME COURT, ARIZ. LEGISLATURE 248 (2016), 
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 224. See ARIZ. LEGISLATURE, supra note 223, at 248. 
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2.  The Cost of Additional Supreme Court of North Carolina Justices 
In North Carolina, given the current financial condition of the 
North Carolina judiciary, this factor also weighs against the 
implementation of court-packing legislation, as it would be preferable 
to introduce these additional expenses at a time when the financial 
condition of the judiciary is stronger. The actual cost of adding two 
supreme court seats includes two annual salaries—$146,191 each, as 
of January 2017225—plus other fixed expenses associated with the 
justice position, including law clerk salaries, office space, and support 
staff salaries. Some observers have “conservatively” estimated that 
this increase would add at least $500,000 to the North Carolina 
judicial branch’s budget.226 
At first glance, this expense appears reasonable, especially if it is 
accompanied by a budget increase similar to that of Arizona. 
However, the current state of the North Carolina judicial branch 
sheds better light on the actual effect of this additional burden. As 
noted by Chief Justice Martin, the judiciary’s “operations budget is 
under tremendous stress, and we have been forced to rely on money 
available from vacant positions to cover shortfalls for basic functions 
such as payments to jurors, court reporters, and expert witnesses.”227 
As of 2015, North Carolina’s entire judicial budget was only $464 
million—less than three percent of the state’s total budget.228 And as 
noted by Chief Justice Martin, this trend is nothing new, since “[o]ver 
the past twenty-five years, [North Carolina’s] commitment to the 
judiciary has not exceeded 3% of the state budget.”229 Thus, although 
the cost of adding justices may seem low, the practical effect of this 
change would be to detract already scant funds from the “basic 
services” of the judiciary.230 If these functions remain underfunded, 
the same inefficiency issues will arise: timely trials cannot be 
provided; offenders are not quickly apprehended, tried, or sentenced; 
and the public’s trust and confidence in the judicial branch is 
damaged.231 
 
 225. How States Set Judicial Salaries, SURV. OF JUD. SALARIES (Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts., 
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 228. Id. at 5–6. 
 229. Id. at 6. 
 230. Id. at 5. 
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In addition to the difficulties posed by the already meager funds 
for the judiciary, the non-partisan, multi-disciplinary commission 
proposed by Chief Justice Martin, the NCCALJ, which was created to 
“ensure that the Judicial Branch conserves its valuable resources,”232 
has never recommended that the legislature add supreme court 
justices. Nowhere in any of its existing reports has the NCCALJ ever 
indicated that increasing the number of justices is an wise, let alone 
necessary, funding decision for the judicial branch. This silence stands 
in stark contrast to the Bell Report’s recommendations, which 
included a realistic and concrete financial plan.233 Accordingly, 
although the General Assembly is by no means required to abide by 
the advice given by the judiciary or its counterparts, changing the size 
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina without a fiscal plan or 
concrete, objective recommendation is nonetheless strong evidence 
that the court-packing effort is politically motivated. 
In sum, diluting the already-thin judicial budget with this 
additional cost would require the judiciary to further diminish the 
funding of other judicial programs that are fundamental to an 
operative court system. Without these basic functions, it does not 
matter how many justices sit on the supreme court—justice cannot be 
served by a court that lacks jurors, expert witnesses, proper 
technology, or well-trained staff. Thus, in order for this factor to shift 
in favor of court-packing proponents, any North Carolina court-
packing plan must include a corresponding provision that allocates 
more financial resources to the judicial branch, similar to that of 
Arizona. But without a budget increase, this cost would be nearly 
impossible to justify given the current financial climate of the North 
Carolina judicial branch. 
C. Effect on the Integrity and Independence of the Judicial Branch 
1.  Defining “Judicial Integrity” 
As noted in the very first sentence of the North Carolina Code of 
Judicial Conduct, “[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is 
indispensable to justice in our society.”234 Justice Anthony Kennedy 
 
 232. Id. at 6. 
 233. See BELL REPORT, supra note 102, at 46 (“The establishment of a unified and 
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succinctly explained why exactly the concept of judicial integrity is so 
“indispensable” in his concurring opinion in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White235: 
Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course 
of resolving disputes. The power and the prerogative of a court 
to perform this function rest, in the end, upon the respect 
accorded to its judgments. The citizen’s respect for judgments 
depends in turn upon the issuing court’s absolute probity. 
Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the 
highest order.236 
Inherent in this “state interest of the highest order” is the idea of 
judicial independence. Although the meaning of this term has shifted 
throughout the course of history,237 it can be broken down into two 
corresponding, but nonetheless distinct, facets. First is decisional 
independence, which is premised upon the idea that judges’ decisions 
should not be affected by outside political pressures.238 More relevant 
to the court-packing analysis, however, is the concept of institutional 
independence. Because the judicial branch is a “coequal partner” of 
the legislative and executive branches, it must also “have the 
authority to govern and manage its internal affairs, free from undue 
interference by the other branches of government.”239 Absent such 
independence, the judiciary can no longer safeguard against 
governmental oppression of individual liberties240 or autocratic 
regimes. Moreover, since the judicial branch is devoid of any power to 
actually implement the decisions they produce, any diminution of 
 
 235. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 236. Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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judicial legitimacy further weakens this branch’s ability to reach their 
policy goals.241 
Because of the “indispensable” nature of judicial independence 
and integrity, any action that has even the slightest potential to 
undermine the court’s fundamental role should not be taken lightly. 
Of course, judicial power is not absolute, as the other co-equal 
branches—as well as the general public—are vested with the power to 
scrutinize the decisions of the judiciary. However, when an outside 
actor makes changes to the judicial branch for political reasons, this 
not only violates the fundamental tenants of the judiciary but also 
jeopardizes the legitimacy of the entire government. 
In the context of the court-packing debate, Roosevelt’s 1937 plan 
provides the best example of the potential effect of court-packing 
legislation on the independence and integrity of the judicial branch. 
The controversial nature of the President’s court-packing plan 
stemmed from the fact that it “forced the public to choose between 
the widely approved policies of an extremely popular president and 
the institutional integrity of a controversial Supreme Court.”242 This 
juxtaposition effectively forced American citizens in between a rock 
and a hard place. Those who approved of the plan were also 
supporting the erosion of the Court’s most “indispensable” role as an 
independent body, while the plan’s opponents permitted the country 
to fall even deeper into its post-Depression decline.243 A similar 
choice seemed to be tacitly posed to the Court itself: either sacrifice 
its substantive policy decisions against Roosevelt, or risk upheaving 
the legitimacy of the branch altogether.244 
Of course, this portrayal is overly simplistic in that it does not 
account for whether the President’s actions were in fact necessary at 
the time given the polarizing actions of the Court leading up to this 
controversy. Nonetheless, the Court’s “switch in time,” the public 
outcry, and the complete lack of any legitimate federal court-packing 
attempts since 1937 serve to demonstrate the influence that judicial 
legitimacy truly plays in the overall court-packing debate. 
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2.  The Effect of a North Carolina Court-Packing Plan on Judicial 
Integrity 
In the context of the North Carolina court-packing debate, this 
factor weighs most strongly against supreme court expansion and 
distinguishes North Carolina from other court-packing legislation. As 
discussed in Section II.C, the North Carolina General Assembly has 
been largely successful in its recent efforts to influence judicial 
elections. Since gaining control in 2011, Republicans on the North 
Carolina General Assembly have shown little hesitation in making 
controversial and politically motivated changes to the judicial branch, 
even when doing so patently diminishes the independence of the 
state’s court system. Even assuming that the retention election law, 
ballot order law, and party affiliation laws were all originally passed 
for genuinely non-political reasons, there is no comparable, objective 
justification for their subsequent revisions and amendments. If, for 
example, a randomized ballot order for judicial elections was the 
“fairest system” in March 2017, how can it be plausibly argued that 
this was not the case in June 2016? 
Overall, the legislature’s actions have been swift, resourceful, 
and, most problematically, effective. As discussed in Section II.D.2, 
the General Assembly’s concrete influence over the judicial branch 
can hardly be questioned in light of the 2016 election results. By 
controlling what information voters receive and how they receive it, 
the legislature can continue to ensure that judgeships remain 
occupied by their allies. The passage of the retention election law and 
elimination of judicial primaries are perhaps even more concerning, 
as they serve to remove North Carolina citizens from the judicial 
election process altogether. Yet, as explained in Section II.D.3, the 
fact that these actions erode the foundational principle of separation 
of powers appears inconsequential to Republican legislators, as there 
is no indication that this trend will reverse anytime soon. Thus, as 
noted by a University of North Carolina law professor, “[If] the North 
Carolina legislature went through with adding justices to the court, it 
would mean state government could literally control the courts, and it 
would undermine the courts’ ability to be nonpartisan.”245 
The public’s reaction to these laws, however, is even more critical 
to this analysis than the legislature’s unabashed willingness to propose 
and pass them. According to recent data, the perception of North 
Carolina’s government, specifically the General Assembly, indicates 
that these actions have not gone unnoticed. Even before the 
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November 2016 election, North Carolinians were displeased with the 
direction in which the state seemed to be headed. In an April 2016 
poll of “likely” North Carolina voters—less than a third of which 
identified as either “very liberal” or “somewhat liberal”—58% of 
respondents felt that North Carolina “has gotten off on the wrong 
track,” while only 31% percent believed that the state was “headed in 
the right direction.”246 
After the 2016 election, outside observers had similar (albeit, 
more extreme) pre-election perceptions of North Carolina’s 
government. In a 2016 report issued by the Electoral Integrity Project 
(“EIP”), North Carolina had one of the lowest “electoral integrity” 
scores of all fifty states.247 Although the EIP’s global findings have 
been met with skepticism,248 the report has nonetheless sparked a 
debate on the issue of North Carolina’s poor-quality elections. Based 
on the EIP’s data, one political scientist concluded, “North Carolina 
can no longer call its elections democratic.”249 Although this 
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conclusion is widely disputed,250 some observers still agree with the 
report’s overall conclusions, despite its flaws.251 
Perhaps most telling, however, are the most recent approval 
ratings of the North Carolina General Assembly. According to an 
August 2017 poll of North Carolina voters issued by Public Policy 
Polling—an admittedly left-leaning organization252—a mere 18% of 
respondents indicated that they approve of the job that the General 
Assembly is doing.253 58%, in contrast, disapproved of the legislature, 
while 25% were unsure.254 More specifically, 55% of respondents had 
an “unfavorable” opinion of Republicans in the North Carolina 
legislature (compared to 32% who had a “favorable” one), and 46% 
had the same “unfavorable” view of Democratic lawmakers.255 
This data therefore indicates that North Carolinians are paying 
attention to their elected representatives, and a majority of the state’s 
constituents are growing increasingly unhappy with what they see. 
Even assuming that the legislature’s actions played no role in the 2016 
election, the mere perception that judges could be making decisions 
based on political pressure or personal bias still damages the integrity 
of North Carolina courts and the state government as a whole. 
Accordingly, any court-packing attempt in North Carolina would only 
 
 250. After it went viral, Reynolds’ article was even subtly condemned by one of the 
study’s own authors, who noted, “There is no independent and reliable measure of how 
U.S. states rank in terms of liberal democracy. But, moving beyond hearsay and anecdote, 
new evidence is available assessing the quality of elections.” Pippa Norris, U.S. Elections 
Rank Last Among All Western Democracies, ELECTORAL INTEGRITY PROJECT (Jan. 7, 
2017), https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/eip-blogs/2017/1/7/its-even-worse-than-
the-news-about-north-carolina-american-elections-rank-last-among-all-western-democracies 
[http://perma.cc/X2AM-54N3]. 
 251. See Adam Hamze, North Carolina’s Democracy Ranked on Par With Cuba, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/north-carolina-no
-longer-democracy_us_585db3e7e4b0de3a08f5699f [http://perma.cc/BG5B-JVVL] (“Patsy 
Keever, chairwoman of the North Carolina Democratic Party, agreed with the report, 
saying that her state’s current efforts at governing do not adhere to democratic 
principles.”); Matthews, supra note 248 (concluding that, despite the study’s flaws, the 
EIP’s research “does point the way for some sensible policies that improve democratic 
participation and are implemented by some of the best-performing states in the US”). 
 252. See Abbie Bennett, People Split on McCrory Running for NC Governor Again in 
2020, Poll Says, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 10, 2017, 8:40 AM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article166332852.html 
[http://perma.cc/X5DC-L3AL]. 
 253. TOM JENSEN, PUB. POL’Y POLLING, NORTH CAROLINIANS STRONGLY OPPOSE 
DOJ CUTS; LIKE COOPER; DOWN ON TRUMP 4 (2017), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com
/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/PPP_Release_NC_80917.pdf [http://perma.cc/RJ9Q-WGEH]. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. Again, given that 41% of respondents identified as Democrats, 33% as 
Republicans, and 26% as Independent, political party could not have been the 
respondents’ only consideration. Id. at 6. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1126 (2018) 
1174 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
exacerbate these negative public impressions and further diminish the 
independence of the judiciary. 
Of course, that is not to say that court-packing should be 
permitted, so long as the public does not notice and the government 
has no track record of judicial interference. Rather, the purpose of 
this factor is to highlight the need for any court-packing plan to be 
concretely tied to a legitimate, non-partisan motive. Indeed, this 
factor was the clearest difference between the court-packing laws of 
Arizona and Georgia and those of its unsuccessful predecessors: 
Arizona and Georgia court-packing proponents were able to point to 
concrete, practical considerations, while other states’ proposals were 
expressly linked to partisan goals. In the context of North Carolina, 
any attempt to justify a court-packing plan on non-political grounds 
would be futile—at least, without a larger caseload, additional funds, 
or a fundamental change in the operations of the North Carolina 
General Assembly. 
CONCLUSION 
If the recent upsurge in court-packing proposals continues, this 
phenomenon will have a detrimental and irreversible impact on the 
independence of the judicial branch. When partisan politics are 
injected into the judiciary, the public perception of the court system 
falters. A healthy, well-functioning judicial branch cannot exist 
without public confidence and decisional independence. Proposals to 
expand supreme courts, regardless of their underlying motivations, 
should therefore only be used as a last resort. Even when such 
expansion is the only plausible option, legislators still should take 
several non-partisan, objective factors into consideration before 
increasing the size of their supreme courts. If they fail to do so, they 
are not only at risk of alienating their constituency; they also place the 
entire doctrine of separation of powers at risk. 
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